私募股權基金與其對目標公司公司治理之影響

Private Equity Fund and Corporate Governance of Target Companies

胡詩梅(Shih-Mei,Hu)

指導教授 ： 張心悌

國立臺北大學/法律學院/法律學系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

近年來私募股權基金大舉來台尋找併購標的，如凱雷收購日月光、H&Q與美林共同收購致伸科技、遨睿收購國巨案等，若私募股權基金收購成功，其是否能提升我國目標公司之治理能力，引人好奇，此將會影響到我國面對私募股權基金的態度。因此，本文將介紹私募股權基金的運作模式，以及美國法上之有限合夥制度，輔以國外對私募股權基金與公司績效正面關聯的實證分析，並分析私募股權基金經營我國公司之案例，探討此問題。最後本文以私募股權基金能減少目標公司的代理成本與提升目標公司監督力量之觀點，基本上肯定私募股權基金對公司治理的正面力量。
另外，有鑑於歐美國家的金融改革法案紛紛出爐，如美國Doll-Frank法案以及歐盟非傳統投資基金經理人監管指令(AIFM)通過後，其對私募股權基金產生的影響為何，亦值探討。本文認為，這些法案或限縮私募股權基金的豁免空間，或加強資訊揭露義務與私募股權基金經理人的責任，總體而言，歐美國家的管制乃趨嚴，將會增加私募股權基金的交易成本，未來私募股權基金的發展將會受有一定程度的限制。
而本文最後亦從公司治理之角度，整理出私募股權基金於收購、經營我國目標公司時可能引發之風險。於收購階段方面，包括了利害衝突風險以及超額融資與資本弱化風險；於經營階段方面，則包括了利害衝突風險與資產剝離風險。於經營階段方面，本文分析了國內外之法制，認為依我國現行的法規範處理此類風險即可，並無須如歐盟AIFM的指令般增訂相關規範。然而，於收購階段方面，本文認為現行法制仍有所不足，故提出以下之建議。
就利害衝突風險而言，因為私募股權基金慣用的管理階層收購模式中，屆時管理階層將身兼買家與賣家之雙重身分，則目標公司將會面臨管理階層犧牲其利益的疑慮。因此，本文建議有被收購公司應設置審議委員會，評估整體收購計畫，以及適當揭露公司為防止利益衝突所採取的措施。而就超額融資與資本弱化之風險，由於私募股權基金多會舉債併購，為避免目標公司承擔高額負債，而有資本弱化之情形，本文建議主管機關應對負債比率設限，並於審查時應注意多層次轉投資之情形。

關鍵字

私募股權基金 ； 公司治理 ； 管理階層收購 ； 槓桿收購 ； 有限合夥 ； 融資比率限制 ； 資產剝離 ； 利益衝突 ； 審議委員會

並列摘要

In recent years, foreign private equity funds aggressively look for mergers and acquisitions our local companies by implementing the leverage method. For examples, Carlyle Group showed a highly interest in the acquisition of Advanced Semiconductor Engineering, Inc. and H&Q allied with Merrill Lynch acquired Primax Electronics Ltd..This thesis statement mainly focused on whether a successful acquisition could improve the ability of the target companies’ corporate management or not. The results would influence the Competent Authority’s attitude of facing the private equity funds in Taiwan. This thesis would also describe the operation method of private equity funds, and the rules and regulation of limited partnership in United State’s law. Basically, this thesis is positive to the private equity funds; it could improve target companies’ corporate governance and reduce their agency costs.
In addition, the U.S. and European countries had come out with several financial reforms such as Doll-Frank Act in 2010 and AIFM Directive in 2011. This thesis also discusses about these financial reform acts’ influences of private equity funds. It will have a significant impact on advisers for the private equity funds by requiring the registration of certain unregistered advisers and imposing additional reporting and disclosure requirements on investment advisers. In general, these acts will increase the transaction costs of private equity funds. Therefore, the development of private equity funds will be limited.
From the corporations’ point of view, put together private equity funds at the time of acquisition, local target companies could lead to risk in the acquisition. These risks include conflicts of interest and excessive leverage arising from acquisition phase; and conflicts of interest and asset stripping in operation phase. In operation phase, this thesis finds that it’s not necessary like AIFM Directive to amend Taiwan’s existing law. However, in acquisition phase, this thesis suggested that our existing law needs to improve and made the following recommendations.
Usually private equity funds use MBO method to acquire target companies. When the member of acquirer was involved in multiple interest of the target company, conflicts of interest occurred. Due to the management owned contractual duties under his contract of appointment with private equity funds. On the other hand, the management must act in the best interest to the target company and the shareholders. Target company will face the risk that the management are likely to deprive the interests of shareholders and the target company. To avoid or prevent this risk, this thesis suggests that target companies should establish a “special committee” to value the whole acquisition plan, give independent and objective advices, and appropriately disclose information about approaches applied in the face of conflicts of interest transaction.
In terms of the risk of excessive leverage, due to the private equity funds usually make use of a leverage method to merge or acquire our local companies, they may cause target companies hard to afford the loans. This thesis suggests that our competent authority should set a leverage limit to avoid the risk. Hopefully this thesis can be considered as a reference document and make some contributions to future amendment.

並列關鍵字

private equity fund ； corporate governance ； management buyouts ； leverage buyouts ； limited partnership ； leverage limits ； asset stripping ； conflicts of interest ； special committee

參考文獻

蔡鐘慶，從比較法觀點探討我國私募制度之法律佈局，私立中原大學財經法律學系碩士論文，2003年。

謝昀哲，論我國股份有限公司之資產分派與發還—資本三原則之檢討，國立臺灣大學法律學院研究所碩士論文，2010年。

許伯如，私募股權基金參與台灣企業重建之個案分析，國立臺灣大學管理學院碩士在職專班高階公共管理組碩士論文，2007年。

陳美菊，美國公司治理，經濟研究，第4期，2003年12月。

王文宇，企業併購法總評，月旦法學雜誌，第83期，2002年4月。