國際排放交易參與誘因及環境有效性之研究

The Participation Incentive and Environmental Effectiveness of International Emissions Trading

劉縈錡(Ying-Chi Liu)

指導教授 ： 李叢禎

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/經濟學系/碩士(2008年)

摘要

聯合國氣候變化綱要公約締約國會議已於2005年開始協商後京都時期之溫室氣體減量承諾。本文引用京都議定書中所明列「排放交易」之減量彈性機制，刻劃個別國家選擇參與國際排放交易行為，以作為國際協議之參考。另外，世界上並未存在跨國且具強制力的主管機構，指定個別國家應負起的減量責任，故各國乃基於自利誘因進行初始排放權配額之選擇，因此透過國際排放交易制度能否降低全球溫室氣體排放量，確保「環境有效性」之目標達成，亦為必須深入研究的議題。
文中透過定性理論分析並結合定量數值模擬，研究因應溫室效應，全球各國參與國際排放交易之策略行為，同時探討該機制能否有效降低全球溫室氣體排放量，將所得之結論整理如下： (1) 國際排放交易團體之形成有三條件：其一是選擇參與國際排放交易的國家並無誘因背離團體，將以搭配國內減量與國際排放交易之兩種方式，處理溫室效應之外部性問題；其二是選擇不參與國際排放交易的國家並無誘因加入團體，單以國內減量之方式，處理溫室效應之外部性問題；其三是全球國家均認為此種交易團體型態是最佳的。 (2) 國際排放交易制度能否有效降低全球溫室氣體排放量之決定因素為，參與國之減量技術以及其因全球溫室氣體排放所遭受的損害程度。若低損害環境國家之減量技術為國際排放交易團體中較有效率者且高損害環境國家為較無效率者，則國際排放交易制度能有效降低全球溫室氣體排放量；反之，則國際排放交易制度不能有效降低全球溫室氣體排放量。 (3) 模擬中國、歐盟以及美國參與國際排放交易之策略行為，發現中國與歐盟將形成排放交易團體，而美國將獨自於國內減量。 (4) 相較於三經濟體同時不參與或同時參與國際排放交易的團體型態，該種排放交易團體型態之總溫室氣體排放量均較低。

關鍵字

國際排放交易 ； 環境有效性

並列摘要

In 2005, signatories negotiated post-Kyoto greenhouse gases (GHGs) abatement at the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This paper discusses the process of each country deciding whether or not to become a member of International Emission Trading (IET), which is an abatement mechanism listed in the Kyoto Protocol. Besides, since there is no central authority with the power to determine the initial allocation of tradable allowances, each country will choose its initial allowance based on its self-interest. Whether the global GHGs emissions are rising or falling is ambiguous. Therefore, the environmental effectiveness of IET is still unknown.
With the theoretical models and numerical simulations, we have several findings: (1) There are three conditions in the forming of IET group. The first condition is that countries which belong to the IET group won’t deviate from it. When the countries face the greenhouse effect, they could reduce their own emission, trade emission with other countries, or both, to solve the problem. The second condition is that countries which don’t belong to IET group won’t join it. The only way for them to solve the greenhouse effect is to reduce their own emission. The third condition is that each country thinks that the group type is best. (2) The environmental effectiveness of IET depends on the technology and the environmental damage of the IET membership. If the members with lower environmental damage have the higher technology and the members with higher environmental damage have the lower technology, IET is environmentally effective. (3) The numerical simulation shows that China and European Union will participate in IET, but the United States won’t. (4) The total GHGs of the situation in (3) will be lower than the situation where three countries all participate in IET or all not.

並列關鍵字

International Emissions Trading ； Environmental Effectiveness

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