本研究的主要目的,在探討CEO異動期間,經理人是否會藉由裁決性應計數盈餘操弄,以謀取私人利益的情形。研究發現在CEO異動期間,僅有在新任CEO繼任當年度,有明顯的藉由裁決性應計數向下調整盈餘;而家族企業CEO在該期的向下調整程度,顯著小於非家族企業的CEO,至於在卸任CEO離職前1年(或前2年)及新任CEO在繼任後第1年(或第2年),則無明顯使用裁決性應計數,使盈餘向上調整。然而;當卸任CEO成為董事長後,新任CEO在繼任後第1年及第2年明顯地藉由裁決性應計數,向上調整盈餘。尤其是當新任CEO係來自公司內部高階主管的升任,其原因有可能如Lucier, Wheeler, and Habbel (2007)所述,前任CEO繼續擔任董事長一職,董事會有可能選擇不具備CEO的必要能力,但聽任於董事長的人物,使董事長仍能在經理人團隊保留影響力;而新任CEO在董事長的庇護下,降低了新CEO因績效不佳而離職的可能性,因而允許其就任之初的盈餘管理行為;亦有可能是最後盈餘操弄的決定權係取決於董事長而非CEO。當新任CEO由董事長兼任,則會助長新任CEO繼任當年度盈餘管理的行為。
The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between chief execute officer (CEO) turnover and earnings management. The result indicates that the incoming CEO adjusts the earnings downward by discretionary accrual (DA) in his succession year, and the adjusting extent in non-family firms is larger than the non-family firms. However, our result can not support that the departing CEO adjusts earnings upward by DA in his final year (or the final second year) and the incoming CEOs’ first full year (or the second full year). When the departing CEO is to be a chairman of the board of directors, the incoming CEO manipulates the earnings upward by DA in his first full year and the second full year. This result is consistent with Lucier, Wheeler, and Habbel (2007) that the chairman who was former CEO would like to appoint an ineffective CEO but comply with chairman’s command (we call apprentice CEO) to keep his influence in management team. Therefore, the chairman who was a former CEO admits the new CEO to manipulate earnings upward to cover up his poor performance, especially when an incoming is promoted from inside. We also find that the negative DA is significantly exacerbated in incoming CEO’s succession year when incoming CEO is served by the chairman of the board.
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