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  • 學位論文

薪酬委員會品質、高階經理人誘因薪酬與企業績效關聯性之研究

The Association Between Quality of Compensation Committee, Managers' Compensation and Firm Performance.

指導教授 : 朱炫璉
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摘要


解決代理問題之有效方法有二,利用誘因薪酬激勵高階經理人,或是透過良好的監督機制,確保高階經理人對企業目標之努力,而我國金管會強制上市櫃公司於2011年底設置薪酬委員會,即是期望增加高階經理人薪酬制訂之合理性與透明度,倘若能透過薪酬委員會這樣的內部公司治理機制管控高階經理人,應該比漫天喊價的誘因獎酬更能降低代理成本。因此,本研究藉由探討薪酬委員會品質的高低是否具有影響高階經理人誘因薪酬與企業績效關係之調節效果,期望可作為企業未來在調整薪酬委員會組成及制定高階經理人薪酬時之參考。   本研究以我國上市及上櫃公司為研究對象,樣本期間主要為2011年,部分變數為2012年,計953筆觀察值,本研究使用現金紅利作為誘因薪酬之代理變數,並以五項品質特性衡量薪酬委員會品質-薪酬委員會委員之董事年資、薪酬委員會規模、薪酬委員會每年開會次數、委員出席率以及獨立董事比例,採用兩階段估計方法(two-stage method)驗證薪酬委員會的品質對於高階經理人誘因薪酬與企業績效關聯性之影響。研究結果指出薪酬委員會品質與高階經理人誘因薪酬確實存有相互抵換的關係,證實薪酬委員會品質提高時,在薪酬合約制定上可降低誘因薪酬的權重達到相同的企業績效。

並列摘要


There are two effective ways to solve the agency problem. One is using incentive compensation to motivate senior managers, the other one is using oversight mechanism to let senior managers make efforts on business goals. Financial Supervisory Commission forced listed companies to set up the compensation committee at the end of 2011, expected to increase the rationality and transparency of CEO compensation. The effect of reducing agency costs by using the internal corporate governance mechanisms such as compensation committee to control senior managers should be more effective than the unlimited incentive reward. Therefore, the objective of this study is to discuss whether the manager incentive compensation’s impact on firm performance is moderated by compensation committee quality. The results can offer suggestions for company to adjust the composition of compensation committee and design manager compensation contracts.   In this study I used listed companies as study sample and the study period is in 2011. There are 953 observations for my statistical analyses. This study used cash bonus as an agent variable of incentive compensation, and five quality characteristics to measure the compensation committee quality–directors’ seniority, the size of compensation committee, the frequency of meetings, members attendance rate and proportion of independent directors. I use two-stage method to examine the effect of compensation committee quality on the association between manager incentive compensation and firm performance. Research results indicate that the quality of the compensation committee does have tradeoff effect with manager incentive compensation. It proves that the higher quality of the compensation committee and the less incentive compensation could be use to achieve the same business performance.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


王慧君(2014)。薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬與公司績效關聯性影響之研究〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-2811201414224178

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