以法律經濟分析觀點探討保險市場逆選擇之相關問題與規範 ─ 以據實說明義務為中心

From the Perspective of Economic Analysis of Law to Discuss the Adverse Selection in Insurance Market -Focusing on the Applicant's Disclosure Obligation

初泓陞(HUNG-SHENG CHU)

指導教授 ： 江朝國

國立臺北大學/法律學院/法律學系法律專業組/碩士(2014年)

摘要

保險利益和風險精算係現代保險的兩大基石，被保險人對於保險標的物倘無保險利益，將使保險填補損害之功能消逝於無形，另一方面，假若保險人對於保險金額與保險費用之釐訂，非以危險發生之機率與可能損害範圍作為統計基礎進行精算，將使保險淪為博弈之工具並使被保險人可能因此受有不當得利，是以此二者為健全之保險制度所不可或缺的一環。其中風險精算所需之相關資訊直接影響了交易是否成立、如何成立，惟此類資訊大多偏在於被保險人一方，致使保險市場資訊不對稱的問題特別嚴重，為此實務上發展出眾多的解決方式，包括風險分類與自我篩選、訊號傳遞機制，而最廣泛為各國立法所採納者即是資訊強制揭露，也就是我國保險法第64條的據實說明義務。
我國對於據實說明義務的討論，大多以保險法上最大善意原則和對價平衡原則為基礎，探討該義務之依據、內涵以及適用上所衍生之相關問題。本文嘗試以法律經濟分析的角度切入，先就據實說明義務於經濟效率上之正當性為討論，評估資訊強制揭露之限制，其所侵害之個人利益與因限制所產生之社會公益孰高孰低。在肯認經濟效率為據實說明義務之基礎後，以效率的角度重新審視據實說明義務之相關爭議，包括據實說明義務之受領人、說明範圍、說明時點、違反效力，以及其與保險法第62條的適用關係等，提出應如何解釋適用較符合效率上的考量，以追求社會整體效用的極大化。

關鍵字

逆選擇 ； 據實說明義務 ； 告知義務 ； 保險法第62條 ； 法律經濟分析 ； 資訊不對稱

並列摘要

Insurable interest and actuarial calculations are the cornerstones of insurance. Without insurable interest, “compensation for loss” as the purpose of insurance will be difficult to reach. Besides, if insurers have only limited access to information regarding the possibility of risk and loss severity to calculate insurance amount and premium rate, the insurance system will become more like a gambling, resulting in extra wealth obtained by the insured that exceeds his/her loss. Therefore, insurable interest and actuarial calculations are the must and the most important foundation for insurance system.
The information necessary for actuarial calculations affects whether the signing of insurance contract is completed or not. In addition, rights and obligations of both parties are greatly influenced by the said information. Since the information is usually controlled by the insured, the severity of asymmetric information in insurance market appears to be significant. Several measures could serve as solutions to the problem of asymmetric information, and those measures include signaling, screening and self-selection which have been adopted in practice. The most common method is to have the insured assume the obligation of disclosure of his/her own information, which was already stipulated in Article 64 of the Insurance Act of Taiwan.
Compared to other articles discussing about disclosure obligation in Taiwan, most of the article are based on the principle of good faith and the principle of equality of the premium. Nonetheless, this article attempts to explore the disclosure obligation from the perspective of economic analysis of law. This article also studies the legitimacy of disclosure obligation and how Article 64 of the Insurance Act may be applied in a more efficient way.

並列關鍵字

asymmetric information ； adverse selection ； economic analysis of law ； disclosure obligation

參考文獻

9. 葉啟洲，德國保險契約法之百年改革：要保人告知義務新制及其檢討，臺大法學論叢，第41卷第1期，2012年3月。

16. 熊秉元，法律的經濟分析：方法論上的幾點考慮，臺大法學論叢，第29卷第1期，1999年10月。

19. 經濟部智慧財產局，專利法逐條釋義，自版，2009年4月初版。

15. 林忠義，法律經濟分析的實際運用與極限，律師雜誌，第352期，2009年1月。

4. 陳威榮、黃健柏，台灣住宅地震保險制度研究，保險經營與制度，第11卷第1期，2012年3月。