台灣上櫃公司為跨過上市申請門檻,以及在公司內部人極大化本身財富之動 機下,將優惠審查政策的實施當成上市之捷徑;然而隨著公司經營權與所有權分 離的程度愈來愈高,產生了管理當局與外部投資者間資訊不對稱的代理問題,因 此,轉上市公司相關之公司治理機制如何影響企業決策與價值引發本研究之動 機,具體言之,本研究之目的有二: (一)探討公司內部人持股及董事會特性與上櫃公司轉上市決策之關聯性。 (二)探討公司內部人持股及董事會特性對轉上市後續價值之影響。 本研究以89年至93年間適用批次審查簡化作業之上櫃轉上市公司為研究對 象,樣本公司共計151家,並透過相同產業、規模的上櫃公司作為配對樣本,合 計302個觀察值。本研究實證結果發現: (一)相對於留在櫃買中心的上櫃公司而言,轉上市公司之內部治理機制,內部人 持股中的大股東持股比例與轉上市決策之間具有正向關係,且董事會規模與轉上 市具有負向關係。 (二)相對於轉上市前,公司大股東持股比例於公司轉上市後初期,與企業價值呈 現顯著水準較高之負相關;經理人持股只有在上市後三年呈較顯著之負相關;董 監事持股則與上市後績效不具相關性;董監事質押比例與董事會規模隨著上市後 期間拉長與公司價值間的負相關顯著性更高;雙元制與Tobin’s Q之間在各年度樣 本中皆與Tobin’s Q呈顯著正相關。 (三) 相對於其他優惠審查期間的上櫃轉上市公司而言,經理人持股比例愈低、董 事會規模愈低、公司採雙元制,即董事長兼任經理人,其公司轉上市後的Tobin’s Q變化程度愈高。 綜上,上櫃公司內部人持股愈高與董事會規模愈小,則愈有可能於審查制度 寬鬆之際轉上市;公司轉上市後,大股東持股、經理人持股、董事會質押比例、 董事會規模皆與公司價值之間相較於轉上市前呈更顯著之負相關,符合「利益掠 奪假說」,與本文預期相符。
This study examines the GTSM-TWSE transfer companies applied with simplified batch review as a shortcut to switch listing, for the reason that the OTC listed companies in Taiwan want to switch to listing,and there is a motivation in insiders to maximize their wealth.However,with the diverge between voting right and cash flow right ,there exists the agency problem from the conflict of interest between the management and the external investors.As a result,how the corporate governance of exchange listings influence the corporate value has been the motivation of this study. The objectives of this research are as follows: 1) the association between shareholdings of insiders and nature of board of directors and the decision making of transfer listing firms. 2) the influence of shareholdings of insiders and nature of board of directors on the corporate value of transfer listing firms. This model is applied to the data of the Taiwan stock market (TSE and OTC market)from 1990 to 2004. We will use linear regression model to analysis insider ownership,nature of board of directors and Corporate Governance.The sample population are 151 companies. Model one is paired-samples of the on-cabinet companies according to industry, size and on-cabinet years.Our observations are 302 . The empirical findings of this research are as follows : (1) The correlation between the shareholdings of major shareholder and decision making.of transfer listing is positive,and the correlation between the size of the board of directors and the decision making of transferring into TWSE is negative. (2) In contrast with companies before transferred, the level of negative correlation between shareholding of major shareholders and the value of corporation is higher at the initial stage of transferred. The correlation between shareholding of managers and the value of corporation is significant negative during the first three year of transferred ; there is no significant result between shareholdings of directors and the company efficiency after exchange listing. Both pledged shares of directors and size of board of directors have negative correlation with the value of corporation, and the significance level become higher as time after exchange listing. The correlation between CEO duality and Tobin’s Q after exchange listing is positive, and the level of significance is high. (3) In our sample, companies which has lower shareholding of managers, smaller size of board of directors, and CEO duality, the degree of change of Tobin’s Q are higher. Our research shows that shareholding of insiders and the nature of the board of directors have different degree of influence on its decision for exchange listing. After the firms exchange listing, the shareholding of shareholders, shareholdings of managers, pledge shares of directors and size of the board of directors have negative relationship with the values of firms. Thus, the results concurred with the hypothesis of plundering benefits and tallies with our prediction.
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