鑑於機構投資人與內部人對於公司資訊掌握有優勢且對公司決策影響甚巨。因此,本研究旨在探討機構投資人與內部人持股對公司發行現金增資之影響,藉以了解機構投資人與內部人在公司角色扮演屬性的不同是否影響公司現金增資時資訊的流通。本研究樣本係以民國八十五年至民國九十一年有辦理現金增資上市發行公司為研究對象。實證結果發現,現金增資平均而言對公司股價有正面的效果。在不同市場趨勢及樣本分群後發現,內部人若股權較少時,資訊外洩的情況較嚴重,股價在事前即會有明顯的反應,而在宣告日反而對股價產生負面效果;反之,股權越集中時,公司資訊外洩的程度較低,在宣告前股價比較不會出現異常變動。機構投資人若持股較少,資訊遞延的情況較嚴重,市場對資訊的反應比較慢;若持股較高時,對資訊傳遞則較為迅速。
Because of the institutional investor and insider have advanced information than others, we examine the impacts of the ownership of institutional investor and insider on the information transmission of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Our samples including all of the seasonal equity offerings announced by listed firms from 1996 to 2002. The empirical results show that the market has positive significant announcement effect on SEOs. Under different market condition and sample classification, we also find that the low holding group of insider has serious information leakage and has negative significant announcement effect on SEOs. On the contrast, the high holding group of insider has less information leakage. Besides, the low holding group of institutional investor has serious information delay. But the high holding group of institutional investor is efficient to the SEOs event.
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