不同類型財務危機預警模式之建構－盈餘管理與公司治理機制的實證研究

Empirical Research of Earnings Management, and Corporate Governance Mechanism to Construct the Different Type Financial Crisis of Early Financial Distress Warning Model

黃雪華(Hsueh-Hua Huang)

指導教授 ： 歐陽豪

崑山科技大學/商業管理學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2011年)

摘要

本研究以台灣1996年至2009年之上市櫃公司中曾經發生財務危機之公司為樣本，並採取1：4的比率以相同產業且公司資產總額近似之公司為配對公司。本研究之樣本數為危機公司215家，健全公司860家。本研究之目的是建立財務危機預警模型，並參照文獻探討及公開說明書所使用的變數，先採用獨立樣本T檢定檢測10項盈餘管理與公司治理變數的平均數在財務危機公司與財務正常公司是否有顯著差異，再納入Logistic迴歸中進行下一步分析。實證結果發現：(1)在全體樣本中，股份盈餘偏離差、董監質押比率、董事會人數及董事長兼總經理對公司財務危機的發生為顯著正向影響；控制持股與董監持股率對公司財務危機的發生為顯著負向影響。(2)在實施「上市上櫃公司治理實務守則」前，裁決性應計數、非裁決性應計數及董監質押比率對公司財務危機的發生均為顯著的正向影響；控制持股對公司財務危機的發生為顯著負向影響。(3)在實施「上市上櫃公司治理實務守則」後，董監質押比率、董事會人數、董事長兼總經理對公司財務危機的發生為顯著正向影響，裁決性應計數、非裁決性應計數、董監持股率對公司財務危機的發生均為顯著的負向影響。區分不同類型財務危機之實證結果發現：(1)法人持股率對「跳票擠兌」類型之財務危機的發生為顯著正向影響；控制持股及董監持股率對「跳票擠兌」類型之財務危機的發生為顯著負向影響。(2)法人持股率、董事會人數及董事長兼總經理對「繼續經營疑慮」類型之公司財務危機的發生為顯著的正向影響；裁決性應計數、非裁決性應計數及董監持股率對「繼續經營疑慮」類型之財務危機的發生為顯著負向影響。(3)股份盈餘偏離差與董監質押比率對「紓困財危」類型之財務危機的發生為顯著正向影響；裁決性應計數及董監持股率對「紓困財危」類型之財務危機的發生為顯著負向影響。本研究發現在財務危機發生「前一年」、「前二年」、「前三年」及「前一年至前三年」分析樣本之最適截斷點分別在0.21、0.24、0.19及0.18；驗證樣本之最適截斷點則在0.16、0.37、0.29及0.15，型Ⅰ誤差與型Ⅱ誤差之和最小。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 公司治理機制 ； 財務預警模型 ； 最適截斷點

並列摘要

This paper adopts listed companies which happened financial crisis to be research samples in Taiwan during 1996 to 2009. The matching companies which have near total assets and in the same industry. The criterion of matching principle is 1:4 . The final sampling results are 215 companies belong to crisis companies, 860 companies belong to healthy companies. The purpose of our study is to construct early financial crisis warning model. After literature review, and refer corporate governance variables in public prospectus, we adopt independent T test, to test whether there exist significantly different mean between financial crisis company and healthy company on earnings management and corporate governance variables. At last, we integrate all 10 variables into our model and then run Logistic regression. The following empirical results were obtained：(1)In all whole samples, the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights, pledging ration of directors and supervisors, size of board of directors and chairman is also CEO have significantly impact on the probability of financial crisis. Control voting right and shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors have significantly negative impact on the probability of financial crisis. (2)Before put ”corporate governance best-practice principles for tsec/gtsm listed companies” into practice, discretionary accruals ,non-discretionary accruals and pledging ration of directors and supervisors have significantly impact on the probability of financial crisis. Control voting right have significantly negative impact on the probability of financial crisis. (3) After put ”corporate governance best-practice principles for tsec/gtsm listed companies” into practice，pledging ration of directors and supervisors, size of board of directors, chairman is also CEO have significantly impact on the probability of financial crisis. Discretionary accruals , non-discretionary accruals, shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors have significantly negative impact on the probability of financial crisis. Distinguishing from different categories of the financial crises that proves: (1)Institutional shareholdings ratio have significantly impact on the probability of the “Bounced cheque” of the category of the financial crises. Control voting right and shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors have significantly negative impact on the probability of the “Bounced cheque” of the category of the financial crises. (2)Institutional shareholdings ratio, size of board of directors and chairman is also CEO have significantly impact on the probability of the company’s financial crises of the category of “Concerns continue to operate are selected”. Discretionary accruals, non-discretionary accruals and shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors have significantly negative impact on the probability of the “Concerns continue to operate are selected” of the category of the financial crises. (3)The deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights and pledging ration of directors and supervisors have significantly impact on the probability of the “Relief-financial distress” of the category of the financial crises. Discretionary accruals and shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors have significantly negative impact on the probability of the “Relief-financial distress” of the category of the financial crises. The study found that the financial crisis in the last year、the year before last、two years before last year, and from last year to the two years before last year of cut-off point to analyze samples 0.21, 0.24, 0.19 and 0.18, respectively; validation samples in the cut-off point 0.16,0.37,0.29 and 0.15, typeⅠerror and All the smallest typeⅡerror.

並列關鍵字

Earnings Management ； Deviation of Voting Right and Cash Flow Right ； Corporate Governance Mechanism ； Early Financial Crisis Warning Model

參考文獻

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