油價飆漲下市區公車業者與主管單位之賽局分析

A Game Model for Urban Bus Operator and Regulator Under Soaring Fuel Price Condition

吳立凡(Li-Fan WU)

指導教授 ： 黃台生

國立交通大學/管理學院/交通運輸研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6842/NCTU.2009.01144

摘要

由於近年國際油價大幅飆漲，以及國內油品浮動價格的實施，使得市區公車業者之燃料成本亦隨之攀高。燃料係公車業者不可或缺的生產要素之一，但其價格漲跌卻難以掌握。另一方面，市區公車業屬於管制行業，政府身為市區公車業的主管單位，在諸多考量之下，並不會讓業者任意調漲票價、降低服務水準，甚至停駛虧損路線。在此嚴峻的經營環境之下，本研究藉由專家訪談以及賽局模式的建立，來瞭解市區公車業所受的影響，以及業者與主管單位雙方之間的因應策略與互動關係。
賽局中，業者於成本考量之下決定供給，當油價不斷飆漲，無論怎麼節約成本都無法維持其最低利潤時，將會開始考慮減少供給以降低成本。若業者採停駛虧損路線來減少供給，使社會大眾權益受損，將會對主管單位產生壓力，因此對主管單位的報酬產生了可能的威脅，若主管單位不願社會大眾受到影響，就必須提供補貼或調漲票價，讓業者營收增加，以維持生計。在完全訊息動態賽局的假設下，該均衡將是一子賽局完全Nash均衡。除了模擬業者以停駛虧損路線之方式減少供給外，亦參考主管單位之意見，模擬不停駛虧損路線但針對過度發車路線進行減班。
本研究以2005年臺北市聯營公車各路線之行車統計、核定成本以及該年底油價20.5元/公升為基期，分析油價於各漲幅可能達成的均衡結果。結果發現，若要以降低供給來減少生產成本，減班效果將會優於停駛虧損路線，乘客所受到的影響也將降低。在增加業者營收方面，由於票價調漲可能會導致民怨，故主管單位會先用盡補貼預算才考慮調漲票價。因臺北市公車乘客數量龐大，在本模式的假設下，票價僅調高一元即可抵擋單位油價上漲近八元。
本研究亦發現，雖然業者多表示油價飆漲之影響十分嚴重，但在本賽局模式的模擬之下，若是只有燃料成本上漲，業者在節約成本之後，尚有空間支應當前的油價。推測除了油價飆漲之外，近年原物料漲價以及基本工資調漲，使得占業者成本最大宗的人事成本增加，也是造成業者經營困境的主因。

關鍵字

燃料成本 ； 賽局 ； 市區公車 ； 主管單位 ； 油價

並列摘要

The fuel cost of urban bus operator has been raised rapidly due to the soaring oil price in recent years. Fuel is one of the indispensable production factors for urban bus operator, however, the operator is unable to control the fuel price. On the other hand, the urban bus industry is regulated by government, concern to public interest and traffic, the regulator would not allow the operator to rise ticket price, decrease level of service, or suspend the deficit routes on his own. Via a game model and an interview between players, one in regulator side, 4 in operator side, this research explores the extent of urban bus operator is influenced by soaring fuel price and how these two players respond in the game model constructed.
In this game, the operator will firstly try to economize the production cost as a response to soaring fuel price. If the fuel price keeps soaring, the operator can not maintain the minimum required return rate as a result, the supply amount would be decreased by the operator. Thus, the regulator must help the operator by subsidy or rise in ticket price, to prevent this credible threat that the supply amount might be too low to maintain public interest or city traffic. This will end up with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Besides suspending the deficit routes, reducing the bus frequency is also considered.
Base on the data of Operation Efficiency of City Bus in Taipei City, 2005, and the diesel price, 20.5(NTD/Litre). The result reveals that, decreasing the bus frequency would be better than suspending deficit routes, if operator wants to decrease the supply amount. The amount of bus passenger in Taipei is so large that it can cover the fuel price risen for 8 NTD by only 1 NTD risen in ticket price.
Although many operators complain about high fuel price in the interview, the influence of fuel price is not as severe as they stated after the model simulation. It is concluded that operators might suffer from high material cost and salary expense at the same time.

並列關鍵字

Game ； Urban Bus ； Fuel Price ； Regulator

參考文獻

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