政府策略對民間參與建設案之計畫價值效益評估

公共工程建設是國家永續發展重要且必須的基礎建設，由於各國政府財政日趨困窘，所以在財務上無法充分支援所有的基礎建設，及考慮民間有充沛財務能力及有效率的管理能力，因此政府乃積極推動民間參與公共工程建設。成功的民間參與公共建設可以創造社會的社經活動，促進社會發展與進步。但不成功的民間參與公共建設會造成社會資源浪費。依照國內民間參與公共建設模式之執行經驗來看，民間參與的失敗案例的原因，並不只是發生在議約階段，很多問題是發生在計畫執行階段。所以計畫風險的合理安排與分擔，才能具體保障建設計畫成功的推動，也才能吸引有能力的投資者參與基礎建設。事實上基礎建設計畫牽涉重大公共利益，民間參與計畫三大參與者政府、投資者、融資者中，政府應扮演積極角色，以協助民間參與計畫成功推動與執行。尤其當建設計畫較不具備財務可行性時，政府可以依法(如促參法、政府採購法等)提供足夠誘因給投資者，以減少投資者承擔過大的計畫風險，這些政府所提供誘因，可以在議約階段成為談判策略，以供政府與投資者雙方進行實質議約談判討論。本研究考慮的政府誘因包括授予投資者管理彈性、跨域加值與政府補貼，同時建立一套「政府策略對民間參與建設案之計畫價值效益評估模式」，分析政府誘因對民間參與建設案之財務效果。本研究中所建立之模式包括實質選擇權模式、整合型投資組合模式、跨域加值模式、合作賽局模式，並分別以聯合大學學生宿舍案、百貨商場附屬旅館及餐廳案、苑裡鐵路高架案、高雄旗津纜車案等進行實證案例分析，研究結果顯示政府誘因對財務較不可行之計畫，可以有效增加計畫之財務效益，分析模式並提供計劃參與者間可以藉由議約談判，將建設計畫效益極大化，及讓計畫參與者間合理分配建設計畫效益。這些研究成果可以提供政府於議約談判時參考，使議約談判可以達到三贏結果，以有效提升較不具可行性之民間參與公共建設的財務效益，並降低計畫風險使投資者得以成功推動建設計畫。

關鍵字

實質選擇權；投資組合；外部效益內部化；政府補貼；合作賽局理論

並列摘要

Infrastructure projects are vital and essential for sustainable society development of countries. Many governments have problems of shortage of fiscal budgets, which make these governments impossibly to provide full financial support for all infrastructure projects. With considering ample funds and managerial competent of private sectors, governments introduce eagerly a desirable public–private partnership model for the implementation of infrastructure projects. Successful public-private partnership projects may increase social-economic activities in societies, and make the substantial progress of society development. However, unsuccessful public-private partnership projects may waste society resources. Based on past experience on the implementation of public-private partnership projects in Taiwan, the crisis of failure projects occurred at the time in project planning, construction or operation stages. Hence, a fair risk allocation of project may assure successful implementation of the projects and attract competent investors to invest in infrastructure projects as well. In fact, infrastructure projects have huge public benefits. Governments should play more aggressive roles to assist private sectors in implementing the PPP projects successfully for realization of public interests. Governments may choose to provide sufficient incentives according to current laws to investors for investing in non-viable public-private partnership projects in order to reduce the project risk for private investors. These incentives are used as strategies in project negotiations and these negotiable strategies may become terms and conditions in agreements in contract negotiations. The incentives, which are considered in this study, are to provide managerial flexibility, value capture, and government subsidies to investors. Models for analyzing effects of governmental strategies on the valuation of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Projects are established for investigating financial effects of these incentives in the projects. Four models are established, which are the real option model, the integrated project portfolio model, the value capture model, and the cooperation game model in this study. Four empirical cases are considered, which are a university dormitory project, a department store project with hotel and restaurant, the Yan-Li elevated railway project, and the Kaohsiung cable car project, respectively. The results of case studies reveal that the project financial benefits increase for providing incentives by government to investors in projects. In the meantime, the game model can maximize the project benefits and provide a solution of fair allocation of benefits among stakeholders in project negotiations. These models and results may provide some useful information for stactholders in project negotiation, which can lead to an all-win project negotiation with enhancement of project financial feasibility for non-viable projects and successful project implementation for public-private partnership projects.

並列關鍵字

Real Options ； Project Portfolio ； Internalization of the Externality ； Government Subsidies ； Cooperative Game Theory

參考文獻

8. Bureau of Metropolitan Development of Kaohsiung City Government (2004) Pre-feasibility Study of Kaohsiung Cross-Harbor Cable Car (Private Participation) Project, Kaohsiung City Government, Taiwan.

66. Shah, S. and Thakor, A. V., 1987. Optimal capital structure and project financing. Journal of Economic Theory 42(2), 209-243. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 0022-0531(87)90086-X.

1. Alonso-Conde, A. B., Brown, C., and Rojo-Suarez, J., Public private partnerships: Incentives, risk transfer and real options, Review of Financial Economics, 2007:16(4): 335-349.

2. Amram, M. & Kulatilaka, N. Real Options: Managing Strategic Investment in an Uncertain World. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999.

3. Ashuri, B., Kashani, H., Molenaar, K. R., Lee, S., and Lu, J. Risk-Neutral Pricing Approach for Evaluating PPI Highway Projects with Government Minimum Revenue Guarantee Options. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2012:138(4):545-557.

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政府策略對民間參與建設案之計畫價值效益評估

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