In addition to the limitation of time and geographic distance, a cluster of shareholder meetings in specific date for Taiwan public firms effectively discourages shareholders from implementing their rights. This issue is particularly serious for cross-border investors, and presents a challenge to investor protection and corporate governance. This study collects and analyzes the rules in U.S. and European countries regarding the shareholder meetings, and finds that electronic voting system and virtually shareholder meeting are employed as a solution for the protection of cross-border shareholders’ rights. This study also evaluates the performance of the electronic voting system, which was introduced in 2009. Interestingly, in terms of the shares, firms adopting an electronic voting have a significantly higher shareholders presence in the annual meeting than those firms without it. The results are robust after controlling for other factors. The finding indicates that the electronic voting system successfully increases the shareholders’ presence in the meetings. Finally, based on the practice of corporate governance and institutions, we propose several suggestions for the design and future development of the virtual shareholder meeting in Taiwan.