審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊與CEO誘因薪酬：對公司績效與盈餘管理之影響

Overlapping Membership on Audit and Compensation Committees and CEO Incentive Pay:The Impact of Firm Performance and Earnings Management

黃碧慧(Bi-hui Huang)

指導教授 ： 盧佳琪

國立中央大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2011年)

摘要

本研究主要探討公司治理與CEO誘因薪酬支付比例對盈餘管理與公司績效的影響，並以審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊比例做為公司治理的衡量指標。故本研究以美國2004年至2006年S&P 500公司為樣本，發現盈餘管理和審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊比例有顯著負向關係，和CEO誘因薪酬支付比例有顯著正向關係。本研究更進一步考慮盈餘管理對公司績效的影響，雖然過去文獻發現CEO誘因薪酬支付比例可以提升公司績效，但本研究發現在調整盈餘管理後，CEO誘因薪酬支付比例對公司績效的正向關係即不存在。相反的，審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊比例對公司績效的關係則有明顯且劇烈上升。本研究實證結果主張CEO誘因薪酬會使CEO藉由盈餘管理來提升公司報導績效，而與公司真實績效沒有關聯。但好的公司治理機制是能真正提升公司績效的。

關鍵字

公司績效 ； 盈餘管理 ； CEO誘因薪酬支付比例 ； 審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊

並列摘要

We examine the impact of corporate governance and CEO incentive pay on earnings management and firm performance, and we use the proportion of audit committee members who also sit on the compensation committee as a measure of corporate governance mechanism. The study uses a sample of S&P 500 firms for the period 2004 to 2006. We find that earnings management is significantly reduced by the proportion of overlapping membership and increased by the ratio of CEO incentive pay. In addition, we also investigate the impact of earnings management on firm performance. Prior research finds that the ratio of CEO incentive pay can enhance firm’s performance, but we find that no relationship between the ratio of CEO incentive pay and firm performance when the firms adjust for the impact of earnings management. Inversely, the impact of the proportion of overlapping membership dramatically increases on firm performance. My results suggest that the ratio of CEO incentive pay increase reported performance by the use of earnings management, but no relation to true performance. But better corporate governance enhances firm performance indeed.

並列關鍵字

earnings management ； CEO incentive pay ； overlapping membership ； firm performance

參考文獻

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