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  • 學位論文

盈餘壓力,財務專家對盈餘管理之影響:應計盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理

Under earnings pressures, the impact of financial expertise and earnings management: accrual earnings management and real earnings management

指導教授 : 盧佳琪
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摘要


沙賓法案於2002年公布草案後,引起各界熱烈討論並批評財務專家之定義過於嚴苛,因此美國證券交易委員會於2003年頒布之沙賓法案最終版放寬了對財務專家之要求。在此背景下,本文欲探討財務專家是否仍具備監督功能。 本篇論文使用2004年至2007年共計1357筆樣本,觀察當面臨盈餘壓力時,公司是否設置財務專家於審計委員會、財務專家是否超過一人(大於法令下限)及財務專家同時兼任審計委員會及薪酬委員會之成員時,對於應計盈餘管理-裁決性應計數與實質盈餘管理-買回庫藏股之影響。 研究結果發現,當公司面臨盈餘壓力時,若設置財務專家於審計委員會、財務專家超過一人(超過法令下限)時,均能有效抑制應計盈餘管理之發生,但當財務專家同時兼任審計委員會及薪酬委員會成員時卻無法抑制應計盈餘管理之發生。而在實質盈餘管理方面,當公司設置財務專家於審計委員會、財務專家超過一人(超過法令下限)及財務專家同時兼任審計委員會與薪酬委員會成員時,皆無法抑止實質盈餘管理-買回庫藏股之發生。

並列摘要


In 2002, the SEC issued its proposal on 407, including a tentative and restricted definition of a financial expert, which raised lots of concerns. To accommodate these concerns, the SEC expanded the definition of a financial expertise in 2003. Under this situation, does financial expertise improve a firm’s corporate governance environment? In this paper we use 1357 suspect firms from 2004 to 2007, which face earnings pressures, to examine the impact of whether audit committee with financial expertise, audit committee with more than one financial expertise and financial expertise(s) is(are) both in audit committee and compensation committee on discretionary earnings management and real earnings management. We find that audit committee with financial expertise and audit committee with more than one financial expertise reduce discretionary earnings management, and financial expertise(s) is(are) both in audit and compensation committee induce discretionary earnings management. Audit committee with financial expertise, audit committee with more than one financial expertise and financial expertise(s) is(are) both in audit and compensation committee have no association between real earnings management-stock repurchase.

參考文獻


4. Barton, J., “Does the use of financial derivatives affect earnings management decisions?”, The Accounting Review, Vol.76(1), pp.1-26, 2001.
1. Abbott, L.J., Parker, S., and Peters, G. F., “Audit committee characteristics and restatement”, Auditing: a Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol.23(1), pp.69-87, March 2004.
2. Agrawal, A., and Chadha, S., “Corporate governance and accounting scandals”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.48(2), pp.371-406, October 2005.
6. Bartov, E., Gul, F.A., and Tsui, J.S.L., “Discretionary-accrual models and audit qualifications”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.30(3), pp.421-452, December 2000.
7. Beasley, M.S., and Salterio, S.E., “The relationship between board characteristics and voluntary improvements in audit committee compensation and experience”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.18 (4), pp.539-570, 2001.

被引用紀錄


謝韶芳(2013)。股利政策對實質盈餘管理之影響〔碩士論文,國立臺北科技大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6841/NTUT.2013.00399
葉映萱(2016)。審計委員會品質對於庫藏股交易及應計項目盈餘管理替代關係之影響〔碩士論文,國立臺中科技大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0061-1107201616262500

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