獨立董事設立對CEO過度自信影響之研究

An Investigating of the Effects of Appointing Independent Director on CEO Overconfidence

林幸嫻(Lin, Hsingsien)

指導教授 ： 王明昌

國立中正大學/管理學院/企業管理學系/碩士(2012年)

並列摘要

This paper examines the relation between independent director appointment and subsequent CEO overconfidence. Using annual financial information of listed companies in Taiwan and paired-samples of appointments and non-appointments to analyze CEO overconfidence measures, such as financial forecast bias, net stock purchase and capital investment rate, we investigate the moderating and magnifying effects of independent director appointment on CEO overconfidence under considering independent director functions such as expertise and independence. We find that independent director appointment has significant magnifying effect on CEO overconfidence (financial forecast bias), and independent director independence has significantly intensified impact on CEO overconfidence. The outcome provides a reference to regulator and investors that there is no surveillance effect of independent director on CEO‟s personality.

並列關鍵字

Corporate Government ； Independent Director Appointment ； CEO Overconfidence ； Monitoring Effect

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