本文旨在探討法人持股對於被投資公司內部控制缺失發生的可能性。沙賓法跟隨著安隆案的爆發誕生,其中404條款規定,公司要評估有關財務報導內部控制架構及程序的有效性,並揭露其資訊在每年的報告上。因此很多研究探討影響內部控制缺失的原因與改善方式。而法人持股目前占據投資市場非常大的比例,很多學者研究法人持股對於公司治理的影響。本研究補足有關內部控制缺失的研究,將法人持股加入考量,得出當法人持股比例越大,內部控制缺失發生的可能性越小,且因為法人持股會因為投資目的的不同,而對被投資公司造成不同的影響,因此本篇論文再利用法人持股穩定性當作考量,得出當公司法人持股越穩定,其內部控制缺失發生的可能性越小。此外,排除法人持股穩定性與內部控制缺失內生性的問題,法人持股穩定性與內部控制缺失的關係仍然為顯著負相關。
This study examines whether distribution of institutional ownership affects financial reporting quality. The main institutional ownership stability measures used include ownership persistence and the time-lengths over which institutional investors hold non-zero shares or maintain their shareholding. We find that the stability of institutional ownership is negatively related to the likelihood of internal control weakness. Also, there is a negative relationship between internal control weakness and institutional ownership level. The results are robust to controlling for fixed effects and potential endogeneity of ownership stability. To the best of my knowledge, the evidence has not been documented.