本文主要研究高階管理團隊的薪酬離散程度與審計公費之關的關係,基於管理者的權力理論會造成管理者為了私人的利益,而增加盈餘管理的風險,因此,本研究預期高階管理團隊的薪酬離散程度與審計公費成正相關。另一方面,基於競賽理論,高階管理團隊的薪酬離散程度愈大,愈能激勵管理團隊致力於工作上的績效,以增加晉升的機會而獲得更高的報酬,因此,本研究預期高階管理團隊的薪酬離散程度與審計公費成負相關。 本研究實證結果,高階管理的薪酬離散程度與審計公費呈正向相關,表示管理者權力理論對公司的影響大於競賽理論對公司所造成的影響。 綜上所述,本研究的實驗結果對高階管理團隊的薪酬決策提供了一個新的見解,高階管理團隊的薪酬離散程度對專業經理人的管理行為以及代理衝突所產生成本造成影響。
We investigate whether auditors price the pay dispersion between the CEO and the remaining top management team. Based on CEO power theory, pay disparity generates adverse managerial behavior in the form of private-benefit seeking and thus increase earnings manipulation risk. Therefore, we predict a positive relationship between pay disparity and audit fee. On contrary, tournament theory posits large pay increases induce employees to work hard to increase their chance of getting promoted. Given that, we expect a negative association between CEO pay disparity and audit fees. Consistent with CEO power theory, we find that pay disparity is a priced risk factor by auditors as audit fees are significantly and positively associated with pay disparity. Taken together, our results provide new insights into the dynamics of top management team decision making, the impact of optimal contract design on executive behavior, and the costs to shareholders arising from agency conflict.