This study investigated the relationship between insider managerial ownership and firm performance in the Chinese hotel industry. Insider ownership is defined by the percentage of total stocks held by manager’s shareholders and director’s shareholders. Corporate performance was measured by Tobin’s Q, stock return (SR), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). We conducted our analysis by applying quadratic models to examine the U - shape curve. For more closely look we analyzed the impact of not only total insider ownership (IMS), but also of two different ownership classes: managers (MAS) and directors (DIRS). We used data on public hotel firms listed in the two stock exchanges in China from 1997 to 2014. The main findings of our analysis indicated that there is an evidence of a relationship between insider managerial ownership and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Particularly, IMS and DIRS showed significant impact on Tobin’s Q. However, other variables (SR, ROA, and ROE) did not have any relation to total insider managerial ownership nor with ownership classes, that was mentioned above. Keywords: Insider managerial shareholding, firm performance, China
This study investigated the relationship between insider managerial ownership and firm performance in the Chinese hotel industry. Insider ownership is defined by the percentage of total stocks held by manager’s shareholders and director’s shareholders. Corporate performance was measured by Tobin’s Q, stock return (SR), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). We conducted our analysis by applying quadratic models to examine the U - shape curve. For more closely look we analyzed the impact of not only total insider ownership (IMS), but also of two different ownership classes: managers (MAS) and directors (DIRS). We used data on public hotel firms listed in the two stock exchanges in China from 1997 to 2014. The main findings of our analysis indicated that there is an evidence of a relationship between insider managerial ownership and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Particularly, IMS and DIRS showed significant impact on Tobin’s Q. However, other variables (SR, ROA, and ROE) did not have any relation to total insider managerial ownership nor with ownership classes, that was mentioned above. Keywords: Insider managerial shareholding, firm performance, China
為了持續優化網站功能與使用者體驗,本網站將Cookies分析技術用於網站營運、分析和個人化服務之目的。
若您繼續瀏覽本網站,即表示您同意本網站使用Cookies。