論文摘要內容: 中央銀行正式文件中所載之目標通貨膨脹率若與真實之通貨膨脹率相符則中央銀行被視為具可信賴度。過去研究發現中央銀行可信賴度主要與真實之通貨膨脹率有關,無論其是否與目標通貨膨脹率相符。過去眾人熟知之研究,從Kydland and Prescott 以至於Smet and Wouters以及許多最新之研究均未探討中央銀行可信賴度與其他政府管制之關係。例如Taylor的研究中亦未觸及進口對中央銀行可信賴度之影響。本研究發現 ACFTA (東協-中國自由貿易協定,Asean-China Free Trade Agreement) 確實會透過通貨膨脹率影響中央銀行可信賴度。越高的可信賴度數字代表中央銀行可信賴度越低。
A central bank can be considered as credible when the actual inflation matches the target rate that the bank released as an official statement. Previous studies had found that central bank credibility indeed heavily depends on the inflation, whether or not it matches the target. Popular studies that began from Kydland and Prescott, until Smet and Wouters, and recent discoveries never once stated about the relationship between central bank credibility and ‘other’ government regulation. Taylor’s discussion also did not touch the import’s effect to central bank credibility. This research found that ACFTA (Asean-China Free Trade Agreement) does affect the central bank credibility through inflation rate. The meaning of the rise in the present credibility as told above is, the higher the number, the lower the credibility the central bank has.