本研究的主要目的是探討董監事責任險(Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance;簡稱D&O責任險)在公司權益資金成本上到底扮演著公司治理監督機制或是道德風險之管理者機會主義之角色。本研究之研究期間與研究對象為2008年到2015年的台灣上市櫃公司。實證結果發現,相較於未投保D&O責任險之公司,已投保D&O責任險之公司投資人會要求比較低的權益資金成本,且當投保的保險額度越高時,公司承擔的權益資金成本也愈低。此實證結果支持公司治理監督機制假說,並意涵著D&O責任險被股東及投資人視為一種保護機制,進而降低公司的權益資金成本。
The objective of this study is to examine whether Directors’ and Officers’ (hereafter D&O) liability insurance plays a corporate governance monitoring mechanism or moral hazard managerial opportunism role in the cost of equity capital for firms publicly-listed in Taiwan for the period from 2008 to 2015. The empirical evidence documents that D&O purchasers are more likely to have higher level of equity capital cost than non-purchasers. In addition, the results also demonstrate that purchasers with more D&O liability insurance coverage are more likely to have higher level of the cost of equity capital than non-purchasers. The empirical results are consistent with the managerial opportunism hypothesis and imply that D&O insurance purchasing is viewed as the existence of a managerial opportunistic moral hazard behavior by shareholders and investors, leading to an increase of the cost of equity capital.