內部債務和公司股利政策

Inside Debt and Payout Policy

張峻偉(Chun-Wei Chang)

指導教授 ： 楊淑玲

國立臺中科技大學/資訊與流通學院/流通管理系碩士班/碩士(2014年)

摘要

本研究旨在探討2008年至2012年間我國高階管理者薪酬中內部債務成份與公司槓桿間的關聯，透過代理成本的改變，薪酬成分可能進而影響公司決策；此外，本研究進一步探討薪酬結構與股利支付的相互關係。研究結果顯示，管理者薪酬槓桿會受到公司槓桿正向影響，根據代理理論，當公司面臨愈嚴重的資產替代或風險移轉問題時，應會有愈高的管理者內部債務薪酬。在股利發放部分，當股權與管理者薪酬適當的連結時，股權成分薪酬會正向顯著影響股利的發放，進一部細分股權成分為股票薪酬和股票選擇權薪酬，發現具股利保護作用的股票薪酬對於股利發放為正向顯著關係，而不具股利保護作用的股票選擇權對於股利發放反而還會有負面影響。而債務薪酬對於股利發放亦為負向關係且具高度顯著，結果顯示在自利的動機下，管理者不願發放高股利使未來退休金的支付產生風險。

關鍵字

薪酬結構 ； 內部債務薪酬 ； 股利政策

並列摘要

This paper examines the relationship between the inside debt components of executive compensation and the firm leverage ratio from 2008 to 2012, through the agency costs was changed, the compensation components may affect the firm’s decision-making behavior. Therefore, we further examines the associated with compensation structure and firm payout policy. We find a positive relation between the executive compensation and firm leverage, According to agency theory, when the company is facing more serious asset substitution or risk shifting problem, executive should have more inside debt compensation. In part of payout policy, when executive compensation appropriate link equity, equity components of executive compensation is associated with higher dividend payouts. Equity components of executive compensation is subdivided into a stock-based compensation and stock option-based compensation, we find a positive relationship between stock-based compensation with dividend-protected and dividend payouts, and a negative relationship between stock option-based compensation with non-dividend protected and dividend payouts. The inside debt components of executive compensation also has a significantly positive effect on dividend payouts. In other words, executive in self-serving motivation that will be more reluctant to commit to high dividend policy, because can risk their future pension payouts.

並列關鍵字

Compensation Structure ； Inside Debt ； Payout Policy

參考文獻

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