本研究假定當目標公司之盈餘管理行為成功欺騙主併公司投入合併或收購,將使得主併公司併購後的營運績效不如市場預期,進而導致較差的股價績效。 本研究調查2000年至2007年間之美國上市公司。針對已完成併購之樣本,嘗試以合併橫斷面迴歸分析探究目標公司之盈餘管理變數(包括異常應計數、異常現金流量、異常生產成本及異常裁量性費用等)與主併公司併購後股價績效之關連。 實證結果顯示,在控制其他因素下,(1)目標公司偏高的異常應計數,造成主併公司後續異常股票報酬顯著較差;(2)目標公司偏低的異常現金流量,造成主併公司後續異常股票報酬顯著較佳;(3)目標公司偏低的異常裁量性費用,造成主併公司後續異常股票報酬顯著較差;(4)目標公司的異常生產成本卻與主併公司後續異常股票報酬無顯著關係。本研究證實,目標公司得以成功欺瞞主併公司,主要是以向上操弄應計數及刪減裁量性費用兩大手法,與盈餘管理相關文獻一致。
I hypothesize that when the earnings management from target firms cheats acquiring firms into mergers or acquisitions, the subsequent operation performance of acquiring firms will fail to achieve market’s expectation, resulting in poor performance of stock price. I survey the public listed companies in USA between 2000 and 2007. In a sample of mergers & acquisitions completed, the relationship between the subsequent stock returns of acquiring firms and the targets’ earnings management variables, including abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses, are explored by using pooled cross-sectional regressions. Empirical results reveal that after controlling other factors, (1) higher targets’ abnormal accruals significantly reduce subsequent abnormal returns of acquiring firms; (2) lower targets’ abnormal cash flows from operations significantly improve subsequent abnormal returns of acquiring firms; (3) lower targets’ abnormal discretionary expenses significantly reduce subsequent abnormal returns of acquiring firms; (4) targets’ abnormal production costs, however, are not significantly related to subsequent abnormal returns of acquiring firms. This study provides the evidences that target firms successfully cheat acquiring firms into mergers or acquisitions mainly through manipulating accruals upwards and cutting down discretionary expenses, consistent with related literatures of earnings management.