本研究利用台灣經濟新報資料庫選取2003至2007年台灣地區上市公司(不含金融證券業與油電產業)為樣本,定義出本研究的投資效率指標(IE),以探討企業內部的代理問題與投資決策效率之間的可能關係。本文的實證結果發現:台灣地區家族企業的投資效率顯著地優於非家族企業,對於不同性質的家族企業,對投資效率的影響也有所差異,如家族企業中成立時間較短(未超過30年)的家族企業投資效率亦優於成立較久(超過30年)的家族企業;非集團的家族企業及公司規模大的家族企業其投資效率都優於集團的家族企業及公司規模小的家族企業。有充分的證據顯示:家族企業在投資效率方面的優越性,與這些企業內部的代理問題(包括大股東與小股東之間的代理問題和股東與經理人之間的代理問題)程度較不嚴重有關。因此,在公司治理機制尚未成熟的台灣,家族控股可以視為一種有效率的企業運作模式。
This paper explores the relative investment efficiency of family control firms in Taiwan. By examining a data set consisted of firms in non-financial industry in Taiwan, we find that family control firms invested in a more efficient way than their non-family control peers. Among all family control firms, the investment of young firms (established for less than 30 years) are more efficient than old firms (established for longer than 30 years);the investment of Non-family groups and family control firms of large-size are more efficient than family groups and family control firms of small-size. The superiority of the family control firm’s investment efficiency may be due to the less severity of agency problem within the family control firms (not only the agency problem of the major and the puny stockholders but also the agency problem of the stockholder and the manager). Our finding suggested that family control could may serves as an effective solution of firm’s agency problem among its shareholders and firm’s agency problem between its shareholder and manager.