銀行會對正常放款提列的呆帳準備金,這新增呆帳準備金同時出現在資產負債表及損益表上,因此呆帳準備決策成為銀行業盈餘管理方法之一。本文深入瞭解台灣銀行業是否亦採取此方法,並更進一步探討董事會結構對台灣銀行業盈餘管理之影響。利用1996年至2009年之間的資料,實證檢驗銀行業盈餘管理以及獨立董事制度、董事會規模、經理人的權限是否影響管理盈餘。實證發現,銀行會選擇增加呆帳準備,減少盈餘,以美化財務報表。本研究也發現獨立董事較不從事盈餘管理,而銀行經理人權力愈高,愈會管理盈餘。另外,實證結果也顯示,對於高負債比率的銀行,雖呆帳費用提列愈高,卻實際盈餘波動反而愈大。
The loan loss provision against a bank''s total loans simultaneously appears at the balance sheet and profit and loss statement, in other words, banks need to boost their reserves, which could diminish earnings and increase asset. Therefore, loan loss provision can be used as a tool of bank earnings management. This study examines if Taiwanese banks applies this approach, and further explores how board structure influences Taiwanese banks ‘earnings management. With the data of 1996-2009, it is found that bank would increase the loan loss provision, loan loss reserve and loan charge-off for managing a stable increasing earnings. The empirical results also show that independent directors have not engaged in earnings management, the higher power of bank managers leads to the more earnings management. In addition, it is also found that the banks with higher debt ratio, although loan loss provision is higher, have the higher volatile earning.