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  • 學位論文

多重主理人與多重代理人下代理問題之策略分析

Strategy Analysis for Agent Problems Derived From Multiple Principals and Multiple Agents

指導教授 : 陳俊宏
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摘要


本研究有鑑於當代企業所有權與經營權分離的現象盛行,擬在所有人與經營人皆非僅一人的情形,即主理人與代理人皆為多人之下的代理問題進行研究。本研究欲彌補傳統文獻尚未對多對多的代理模型深入研究,探討兩位主理人和兩位代理人之間的交互作用。 本研究主要結論為:第一,當所有產出為獨立時,而主理人的利潤為主理人間所持有的股份及代理人產量分配時,最適的獎酬計畫為「個人獎酬契約」。第二,當兩位主理人決定共同合作時,主理人給予代理人的邊際獎酬等於主理人的邊際收入,兩位主理人才能達到聯合利潤最大化。第三,在市場需求彈性大時,主理人給予代理人的獎酬與代理人的產量成正相關。而在市場需求彈性小時,則主理人給予代理人的獎酬與代理人的產量成負相關。當市場彈性系數等於1時,主理人給予代理人獎酬越高,反而會導致主理人的利潤下降。第四,當主理人持有的股份將資金成本加以考慮進去時:(1)利潤大於資金成本時,有以下兩種結果:(i)假設兩位主理人同時作決策,便會形成兩位主理人各持有一半股份的情況。(ii) 假設兩位主理人並非同時做決策,便會形成單一主理人與多位代理人情況。(2) 反之,當利潤小於資金成本時,兩位主理人都不會持有股份。最後,如果將利率設定為股份的函數時:(1) 若利率函數一階微分大於0 ,利潤大於資金成本,股份與z始可能為內部解。(2)若利率函數一階微分小於0,利潤大於資金成本且利率函數二階微分大於0, 股份與z始可能為內部解。(3)若利率函數一階微分等於0,此結果會與命題四相同。

並列摘要


This research is conducted under the premise that it is quite common the ownership of the contemporary enterprise is separated from the right to operate; therefore under the circumstances that the owner and the operator are not the same person, i.e. the agent problem derived from both the principal and the agent who are all in the multiple status will be researched as result. This thesis intends to complement multiple vs. multiple agent models which have not been delved into within traditional literatures and proceed to in-depth findings, and explores the interactions between two principals and two agents respectively. Major conclusions of this research are: 1. When all productions are independent, when the profit for the principal is the distribution between share possessed between principals and agent output, the optimal incentive plan would be “individual compensation contracts”. 2. When both principals decide to jointly cooperate with each other, the marginal reward offered to the agent by principal should be equivalent to the marginal income for the principal; then, both principals can reach the goal of maximizing their joint profits. 3. Elasticity of demand in the market situation is big, the principals give the agent the agent''s reward and the output of a positive correlation. Elasticities of demand in the market situation is small, the principals give the agent the agent''s reward and the output of a negative correlation. When Elasticity of demand in the market situation is equal to 1, the principals give the agent reward, but the principals will lead to loss of profits. 4. When the principals hold shares will be taken into account when the cost of capital: (1) when profit is greater than the cost of Capital, following two results: (i) assume that the principals make decisions with the same time, the two principals hold of the shares will form two half principals hold shares in each situation. (ii) assuming two principals are not at the same time to make decisions, the principals will form a single case with a number of agents. (2) Conversely, when profit is less than the cost of Capital, the two principals do not hold shares. Finally, if the interest rate is set to share a function: (1)If Interest rate function first-order differential is greater than 0, profit is greater than the cost of Capital ,stock and z is internal solution (2) If Interest rate function first-order differential is less than 0 , profit is greater than the cost of Capital ,stock and z is internal solution. (3) If Interest rate function first-order differential is equal 0, this result is the same with the four propositions.

參考文獻


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