摘要 過去研究證實商譽減損的認列除了反應經濟實質之外,也存在額外有關經理人裁量權的資訊內涵。公司治理較差下,盈餘管理目的經常誘發經理人行使商譽減損之裁量;公司治理較佳下,內部人資訊會促使經理人行使商譽減損之裁量。 本研究將商譽減損分解為正常減損與裁量性減損兩部份,正常商譽減損起因於經濟上或財務上的理由,裁量性商譽減損則導源於經理人的裁量權利。實證結果發現,無論是公司治理較差或是較佳,裁量性商譽減損與當年度的股價報酬並無顯著關係。然而,對於公司治理較差之公司,裁量性商譽減損與下一年度的股價報酬呈現顯著正向關係;相對地,對於公司治理較佳之公司,裁量性商譽減損與下一年度的股價報酬呈現顯著負向關係。研究結果說明,市場的確無法察覺到商譽減損有不同的資訊內涵。
Abstract Prior researches show that there exist additional contents, conveying the discretion of managers to investors, in the recognition of goodwill impairment except the reflection of economic reality. The discretion of managers may be motivated by earnings management, usually appearing in poor corporate governance, or insiders’ information, usually appearing in better corporate governance. In this study, the goodwill impairment is decomposed into normal impairment component and discretionary impairment component. Empirical results find that the discretionary impairment is not significantly associated with current stock return, whatever in poor corporate governance or in better corporate governance. However, there is significantly positive relationship between the discretionary impairment and subsequent stock return for poor corporate governance. Oppositely, there exists significantly negative relationship between the discretionary impairment and subsequent stock return for better corporate governance. My results indicate that the market fails to appreciate the different information contents of goodwill impairment.