隨著多國籍企業的跨國直接投資活動日益興盛,如今,中國是台灣海外投資的主要對象,尤電子電器製造業之投資額最多;因此,政府應該如何幫助台商在中國市場卡位、進行全球佈局,同時避免外溢效果產生? 本研究採用多階段賽局分析政府政策下多國籍企業(MNEs)的策略,研究工具則利用「Mathematica 5.1」程式設計軟體,處理本研究理論模型下Cournot產量競爭的繁雜數學運算,再根據該軟體精準的圖形分析MNEs策略和政府政策。 研究發現:母國(台灣)政府制定對於本國MNEs較有影響力的「管制政策」,而非獎勵政策。而MNEs可選擇「出口策略」或「海外直接投資(FDI)策略」;發生外溢效果時,地主國(中國)的廠商有機會取得專業技術,甚至以更低的成本進入市場、分食利潤。另外,當MNEs陷入囚犯困境,政府可實施「管制出口政策」協助之,便可迫使他們採取FDI策略,以達柏拉圖最適。
MNEs’ foreign direct investments are being done daily. China has become an important place to produce IT and 3C products. Taiwan’s investments in China exceed 2/3 of all oversea, especial electronic apparatus manufacturing industry. Therefore, how can the government help Taiwan MNEs to carry on the global overall arrangement, to get a ticket into China, and prevent spillover effect? This paper adopts the game theory to research MNEs’ strategy under government policy. And use a design program software “Mathematica 5.1” to deal with the model (ie. Cournot quantity competition). According to the function & figures to analyze government policy and MNEs’ strategy. This research discovered: The government of home country, Taiwan, makes one powerful “control policy” toward MNEs’, but not a reward policy. When the government adopts “semi-control policy of FDI or export”, MNEs’ investment causes technology spillover effect. Giving those firms of host country, China, a chance to enter the market and share the profit. In addition, when MNEs fall into the prisoner dilemma between FDI and spillover. The government could implement a “control export policy” to force firms choose the FDI strategy, then reach Pareto optimality.