中國國有企業自主權、剩餘索取權及其職工努力程度決定之延伸性探討

Autonomy, Residual Claim and Work Effort in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises: A Further Elaboration

黃金樹 ； 許竹筌

《亞太經濟管理評論》 7卷1&2期 (2004/03) Pp. 69-87

https://doi.org/10.30087/APEMR.200403.0005

摘要

本文係探討具包制性質的中國大陸國有企業，如何透過其職工、經理與政府官員三方間的互動，來決定其自主權、剩餘索取權與努力程度的問題。從本文的分析中，可獲致以下幾個主要結論：1、當提高工資或國有企業有較多的最低自主權水準時，會降低努力程度; 反之，當資本使用成本、備權價格或政府規定額有所增加時，職工醬提高其努力程度。2、政府官員在企業的剩餘索取權方面，如過去文獻（黃金樹、何朝明，2001）所述，傾向完全不給予。在自主權供給額度方面，將遵循供給法則，且政府官員具有尋租的傾向。3、經理會將企業留利完全撥給職工，但在自主權需求額度方面，有可能與需求法則不一致，即不見得會跟著其價格的降低而增加。4、企業內部成員對於自主權的需求函數中，自主權需求額度與其價格的關係，除了負向以外，也可能出現正向的關係。5、在一般的情況下，當政府官員不給予企業任何的剩餘索取權，以及經理把留利全部分給職工時，並不影響企業內部成員與政府官員之間，可以經由自主權的議價機能，得到雙方都能接受的自主權均衡價格與自主權額度，並相應決定了職工的勞動努力程度。

關鍵字

中國國有企業 ； 自主權 ； 剩餘索取權 ； 努力程度

並列摘要

We investigate the issue of how Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs), under the contracted management system (Chengbaozhi), make decisions on the issues of autonomy, residual claim and work effort based on the triangular interaction among labors, managers and government officials. Five major findings are concluded in this work. First of all , the work effort decreases when wage is raised or when the level of autonomy is at its lowest. On the other hand, it increases when capital rental, prices of autonomy or payment quota of legal production are raised. Second, government officials inclined to rejecting the SOEs on the issue of residual claim(Huang and He,2001)and to following the law of supply on the issue of autonomy. They also show a tendence towards rent-seeking, at the meantime. Third, while managers will give labors the full legal residual profit, they may show no consistency with the law of demand on the aspect of autonomy, namely, not increasing while price increasing. Fourth, the demand function of autonomy and price for the SOEs members is ambiguous, negatively correlated in general and positively in some. Fifth, in most cases, a mutually accepted optimal autonomy trading price, and consequential labor efforts, between SOEs members and government officials can be reached by the autonomy bargain mechanism. This is still so even when government does not grant any residual claim to SOEs and when managers distribute all the residual profit to labors.

並列關鍵字

Chinese State-Owned Enterprise ； Autonomy ； Residual Claim ； Work Effort

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