論法學上規則與原則之區分－由非單調邏輯之觀點出發

On the Difference of Rule and Principle in Legal Dogmatics-A Nonmonotonic Logical Point of View

陳顯武(Hsien-Wu Chen)

《臺大法學論叢》 34卷1期 (2005/01) Pp. 1-45

https://doi.org/10.6199/NTULJ.2005.34.01.01

摘要

本文從Hart與Dworkin對法實證主義之爭辯出發，而結晶化出其爭辯之根本問題乃是規則與原則區分之問題。Dworkin指出原則之重力面向，Alexy則在此基礎上構作其「基本權原則說」的理論，Alexy對基本權進行分析式的與規範式的理論建構，將原則當作「最佳化命令」，指出原則碰撞解決之衡量模式。爾後，Alexy以代數方式來修飾其衡量模式之結構特徵。於此，在Alexy之重力公式中，明白地顯現出司法判決與立法裁量之賦值會出現「平手情況」。在此情形，Alexy以立法權之制定法律乃爲一形式原則而享有優先性。關於此點，本文指出重力公式可能的另類表現方式及其非單調性。
其次，作者亦由「不動定點」之觀點切入，來表現重力公式中之「結構的游動空間」及平手情況有二個不動定點之特性。就此，針對重力公式中之平手情況，Alexy傾向將經驗層次與規範層次之「認識游動空間」歸於「立法者優先」此一次序規則之運用，本文則指出此點並無法自Alexy所提出之算術運算重力公式中推導得出。
本文亦以現代形式邏輯之表現方式明示出原則結構之有疏漏性、原則推理之非單調性及其知識表現電腦化之界限。同時，本文作者復又發現Alexy之重力公式之與貝氏定理之關聯性。最後，作者本於直觀指出，在博奕理論、非單調邏輯及貝氏定理與原則之衡量模式間之密切關聯性。

關鍵字

規則 ； 例外 ； 原則 ； 初步印象 ； 非單調邏輯 ； 有疏漏性邏輯 ； 衡量 ； 重力公式 ； 不動定點 ； 貝氏定理

並列摘要

This article sets out with the discourse between Hart and Dworkin concerning legal positivism; this controversy crystallizes at the problem of how to differentiate rule and principle. Dworkin points towards the weight axis of principles, which is fundamental to Alexy's 'theory of basic rights'; Alexy engages in an analytical and normative analysis as well as in theory construction of basic rights, making use of principles as 'optimization precepts' and showing means to resolve conflicts between different such precepts by weighing (abwägen) principles against each other. In the aftermath, Alexy makes use of algebra in order to express structural features of his weighing model, actually formulating a weight formula. Within this formula, Alexy points out the values of legal adjudication and legislative weighing can be equal, namely the stalemate situation. However, he still regards the power to legislate as a formal principle of lawmaking and uses this as a base for a claim of superiority. This article uses another form of representation for the weight formula and shows its nonmonotonic character.
Apart of that, the article explores the perspective of the fixed point theory in order to describe the discretion within the structural model and to explain situations of stalemate as being characterized by two symmetric occurrences of fixed points within the model. In case of stalemate within the weight formula, Alexy tends towards restricting epistemic discretion on the empirical and normative level via the claim of 'legislative priority' to a rule of selection. However, the article can show that this proposition can not be derived from A levy's weight formula.
The article also makes use of representation through modem formal logic in order to show defeasibility of principle structure, nonmonotonic characteristics of argumentation by principles and fringes of representation in an IT environment. At the same time, the author finds a relation between Alexy's weight formula and Bayes's theorem. Finally, the author gives an intuitive assessment of the intimate relationship between game theory, nonmonotonic logic, Bayes's theorem and the weight formula of principles.

並列關鍵字

Rule ； exception ； principle ； prima facie ； nonmonotonic logic ； defeasible logic ； Abwägung ； weight formula Gewichtsformel ； fixed point ； Bayes's theorem

參考文獻

Alexy, R.(1979).Zum Begriff des Rechtsprinzips.(Rechtstheorie, Beiheft).

Alexy, R.(1985).Rechtsregel und Rechtsprinzipjen.ARSP, Beiheft.25,13-29.

Alexy, R.(1980).Die logische Analyse juristischer Entscheidungen.ARSP, Beiheft NF.14,181-212.

Alexy, R.(1985).Theorie der Grundrechte.Baden-Baden:

Alexy, R.(1990).Zur Kritik des Rechtspositivismus.ARSP, Beiheft.37,9-26.