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論契約責任與侵權責任的保護客體:“權利”與“利益”區別正當性的再反省

Essay on the Protected Objects of Contractual Liability and Delictual Liability: Rethinking the Legitimacy on the Distinction between Rights and Interests

摘要


本文從民事責任法保護客體「權利或利益」此一角度切入,探討契約責任與侵權責任在權利或利益保護的範圍或程度上究竟有無不同,據以論證契約責任與侵權責任在權利或利益的保護問題上,是否具有區別的正當性。在研究方法上,本文以民事責任之下再區別爲契約責任與侵權責任二種基本類型作爲出發,先探討契約責任法如何看待權利與利益的區別問題,再從權利與利益在契約責任法上的定位所獲得的啟發,重新思考侵權責任法應如何看待權利與利益的區別問題。 本文指出,契約責任與侵權責任的保護客體,範圍並無不同,均包括權利及利益在內。就此而言,權利與利益的區別,並無必要。然而,契約責任與侵權責任的保護客體,是否因其爲權利或利益,而有不同程度的保護,則爲本文論述的核心問題。 在契約責任,權利侵害或利益侵害,並無嚴格區別必要,均予以平等保護,適用相同歸責原理。其理由,除了權利與利益本就難以區別之外,更是因爲契約關係上的權利與利益,均得「具體特定」,當事人具有「預見可能性」。 相較之下,在侵權責任,鑑於契約關係外的利益,通常不如權利一般,得以具體特定並具有預見可能性,因而使得侵權責任究竟應該如同契約責任一般,平等保護權利與利益,或是應該嚴格區別權利與利益,予以差別保護,顯得困難許多。我國通說採取差別保護說,限縮侵權責任法對利益的保護程度,固然在比較法上有德國法之繼受作爲理論依據。但此一通說見解,何以在倡議數十年後,仍未能在我國實務上形成穩定一貫的見解,仍然值得思考。 本文主張,通說見解之下,對利益保護顯然不足。解決之道,應揚棄差別保護見解,直接擴張民法第一八四條第一項前段「權利」範圍,使其包括「利益」在內,使權利與利益的侵害均有「過失責任原則」的適用。理由有二: 第一,權利與利益具有相同的本質,難以嚴格區別,不足以作爲差別保護的正當性基礎,亦不足以作爲拒絕保護利益的法律理由。權利與利益的區別背後所反映者,與其說是二種截然不同的「價值判斷」,不如說是二種各具特性的「法律技術」。權利與利益如果有所不同,乃在其是否具有「具體特定性」或「預見可能性」。「不確定性」,導出侵權責任特別需要平衡兼顧「行爲自由」此一價值,以達到「適度合理限制加害人責任」的目的。落實此一需求的方法,不是以權利或利益的侵害作爲一般侵權責任進一步類型化基礎,並據以適用不同歸責原理,而是在相同的過失責任原則下,於實際認定「損害」、「行爲不法」、「過失」、「因果關係」等責任成立要件時,應參酌權利與利益特性上的不同,作出合理妥適的判斷。 第二,民法第一八四條第一項前段規定的保護客體排除「利益」之後,以現有其他侵權責任規定,無論是第一八四條第一項後段規定或第二項規定,或是擴大解釋第一八四條第一項前段規定的「權利」範圍,實際上仍無法合理妥適解決利益保護不足問題。即使逃避侵權責任,藉助契約責任法理,承認或創設「締約過失責任」及「附保護第三人效力之契約責任」等類似契約責任,但由於此等責任在適用範圍(主體範圍、時間範圍)、責任要件、責任效力等問題上,存在諸多限制或缺失,仍不足以全盤解決問題。 從而,權利或利益的保護,無論是就保護範圍或保護程度而言,不因契約責任或侵權責任,而有所不同。就此而言,契約責任與侵權責任,並無區別的正當性。今後,面對侵害「利益」的民事責任,無論其所涉及者是契約責任或侵權責任,即使法律政策上有必要適度合理限制責任的成立,也不再是加害人是否「故意背於善良風俗」或「違反保護他人法律」的問題,而是「損害」是否存在、行爲是否「不法」、加害人有無「過失」以及行爲與損害間是否具有「因果關係」的問題。此等問題,均是契約責任與侵權責任的共通問題。

並列摘要


From the point of view that civil liability protects both individual's 'rights' and 'interests', this study aims to explore if it is legitimate to distinguish 'rights' from ‘interests’ in order to give them different protections. Article 184 I paragraph 1(superscript st) of the Civil Code (Taiwan) provides that anyone who, by his own fault, intentional or unintentional, infringes upon others' 'rights' is liable for the damage caused to the victim. The principle set by this provision leaves doubts about whether 'interests' enter into the range of protection of this general clause of the law of delict. The core of the problem is whether an unintentional infringement upon an so-called 'interest', especially claims arising from the law of obligations, possession, enterprise interest or pure economic interest etc., would be sufficent to establish a liability for the damage caused to the victim. Whereas the answer of the contractual liability to this question is obviously affirmative, that of the delictual liability presents much difficulties. For the contracting parties, the 'interest' under a contractual relationship is to them 'certain' and 'foreseeable'. This explains why contractual liability protects equally rights and interests. But for the author of a delict, the 'uncertainty' and the 'unforseeability' of the interest under a social relationship make it necessary to take account of another value, i.e. freedom to act, and therefore to limit the liability of the author. That's why the academic writers have controversy on the range of protection of article 184 I paragraph 1(superscript st). The majority of them considers that unintentional infringement upon an 'interest' should be excluded from the application of the above provision. Nevertheless, the courts, especially the Supreme court, hesitate since longtime to take a clear position on this problem. This study takes a different position. It argues that the 'right' and 'interest' have the same nature and it is impossible to distinguish clearly one from another. The other provisions of the existing delictual liability and contractual liability are not the most appropriate means for the protection of the constantly increasing 'interests' in the modern society. The only way is to have recourse to the general clause of the law of delict and extend the its range of protection to 'interests'. Consequently, there is no legitimacy on the distinction between 'rights' and 'interests' neither for contractual liability nor for delictual liability. Under the application of article 184 I paragraph 1(superscript st) of the Civil Code, any unintentional infringement upon either a 'right' or an 'interest' would make the author liable for the compensation of the damage caused to the victim. If, taking account of the 'uncertainty' and the 'unforseeability' of the interest, the legal policy necessitates some limitation of liability, it is by way of the legal techniques such as damage, unlawfulness, fault, causation etc. that the courts can also control the liability to its reasonable measure.

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