公司捐贈與相關代理成本問題之研究

Study on Corporate Donations and Problems of Agency Costs

周振鋒(Cheng-Fong Chou)

《臺大法學論叢》 42卷2期 (2013/06) Pp. 259-315

https://doi.org/10.6199/NTULJ.2013.42.02.02

摘要

公司係以營利為目的之法人，經營者自當為公司股東創造最大利益，然捐贈指無償讓與公司資源予他人，此與公司本質是否相容本非無疑，惟現行學說與法令均已肯定公司捐贈之能力，故此部分暫有定論。具爭議者，大型公司存有企業經營與所有分離之特質，經營者之捐贈決定雖應盡受任人義務，惟如何防止其濫行捐贈或虛偽捐贈，則為重要之問題。現今學說多數肯認慈善捐贈有助公司企業形象提升，對公司並非完全不利且可為盡社會責任之表現，應予鼓勵，但此見解忽略慈善捐贈亦有被經營者作為不法利益輸送之工具。政治捐贈除有上述弊端外，更可能伴隨著賄賂、買票等政商勾結之情事。捐贈雖牽涉股東權益、甚至清廉政治等公私益問題，但現行法令缺乏具體且有效之規範，似不妥當。論及公司捐贈之重要性，本文擬分析捐贈之相關法律問題，尤以代理成本為主要討論中心。本文認為，股東於事後挑戰不法捐贈之困難度頗高，故可考慮制定強制揭露捐贈之規定，使經營者決策時有所警戒，股東則得以知悉與檢驗公司所為捐贈是否妥適，另外，亦可規定公司捐贈時應經董事會決議通過，使捐贈決定之作成更為謹慎。本文結論建議將來能整合運用「事後追訴有責者」、「內部決定程序」與「資訊揭露」等多種措施，防堵不法與虛偽之捐贈，同時達到降低代理成本、維護股東權益之作用。

關鍵字

公司捐贈 ； 慈善捐贈 ； 政治捐贈 ； 政治支出 ； 代理成本 ； 資訊揭露 ； 經營判斷原則

並列摘要

As a corporation in nature is a legal entity for profit-seeking, management shall maximize the profits for corporation and its shareholders. Theoretically and legally speaking, corporations are allowed to donate their resources for particular charitable or political purposes. However, such donations usually raise the agency cost problem that is normally seen in the scenario of separation between ownership and management. Charitable donations could be used as a way to promote a corporation's reputation and to perform corporate social responsibility; however, under current legal system, shareholders who like to challenge an illegal or fake donation made by management and board of directors will confront many procedural difficulties. Thus, there may be no effective methods to prevent fake donations as used for management's utility. What makes political donations worse is that they have other concerns such as bribery or vote-buying, which could seriously harm politics integrity. Unfortunately, there are almost no rules existed to regulate corporate donations, charitable or political, which have above concerns. This Article will analyze relevant legal issues on corporate donations, particularly focusing on the agency cost problem. Based on the analysis, this Article concludes that the shareholder derivative suit provides little hope as used to be the only method to prevent fake or illegal donations. Other complementary devises, such as internal procedures and disclosure, shall be introduced and integrated to help alleviate the agency cost problem that we are currently facing.

並列關鍵字

corporate donations ； charitable donations ； political donations ； political spending ； agency cost ； information disclosure ； business judgment rule

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