1930年代初期東亞區域經濟重心的變化－日本擴張輸出與中國經濟蕭條

一般認為，1930年代中國處於世界經濟邊綠的位置，與西方經濟牽扯不深，不必然捲入世界經濟大恐慌之中，然而當時中國仍深陷於恐慌蕭條的境地。本文試圖說明中國在1930年代初期經濟陷入低迷，與深陷於大蕭條的西方核心工業國家難脫關係，卻也未必全盤源自西方經濟的衝擊，與亞洲本身，特別是日本的歷史發展，不無關聯。本文說明以日本為核心的亞洲商貿網絡在其中扮演的媒介傳播角色。一方面這可以說明亞洲經濟與世界經濟具有桴鼓相應的關係，而在另一方面，這同時顯示亞洲經濟有其相對於世界經濟的獨特發展。世界經濟大恐慌對亞洲的衝擊可能反映了此一全球性經濟危機具有某些區域性特色，為前人所忽略。 1930年代以前大中華經濟圈在亞洲一枝獨秀，當時以其為中心，周圍環繞著許多小經濟圈，這些小經濟圈透過香港、新加坡、上海等仲介轉口港，與中國維持若干經濟關係。另一方面，做為一個多元的交易網絡，歐洲商人也利用東亞華商交易圈，形成了一個把香港、新加坡做為孟加拉灣、南海、東海之間許多小經濟圈的轉口貿易與金融中心。1930年代，日本積極擴張對外輸出，以直航的貿易路線與亞洲各地維持密切聯繫，日貨在亞洲各地取得壓倒性優勢，終將原有各小經貿圈整合於帝國的經濟勢力圈。亞洲內部商貿網絡開始發生變化，阪神、臺北、雅加達因運送日本商品而形成的新興貿易網路，有愈趨發達之勢。相對而言，上海、香港、新加坡等集散中國、甚至歐洲商品連結成的商貿網絡，遂受到前所未有的挑戰。亞洲經濟從以大中華經濟圈為核心的多元經貿圈，走向日本帝國經濟圈獨霸一方的局面，說明趨於蕭條的中國經濟正面對一個蒸蒸日上的日本帝國，亞洲經濟秩序的核心從而決定性地由中國移向日本。許多西方學者認為1930年代美國實施白銀政策，導致中國大量白銀外流，對中國經濟傷害至深，是中國捲入世界經濟大恐慌的重要原因。1930年代，美國取代英國，成為左右亞洲國際經濟秩序最具影響力的國家，美國同時是中國最大的貿易對手國，白銀外流在形成中國經濟恐慌的原因上，不可否認地仍具有第一義的重要性。然而這並不表示日本此－中國第二大貿易對手國，對中國經濟危機的影響，不具舉足輕重的意義。本文說明1930年代日本商品對外探取一種低價取量的行銷模式，在貿易總價上遠不及歐美各國龐大，但薄利多銷，可以爭取較大的銷售數量，擴大市佔率或市場規模。日本帝國主義採取如此開擴商品販路的行銷模式，使日貨的傾銷嚴重威脅國貨出路，並導致中國經濟蕭條的局面。相對於以白銀危機來解釋中國經濟危機的西方史觀，本文有關日貨傾銷的論述，或許可以說是從亞洲觀點出發的東方史觀，對中國經濟蕭條成因的另一種解釋。

關鍵字

世界經濟大恐慌；亞洲國際經濟秩序；集團經濟；日本；大中華經濟圈；商貿網絡；區域經濟重心；殖民地工業化論；亞洲內部貿易論

並列摘要

It is commonly believed that in the 1930s China was just on the margins of the world economy and not deeply involved with Western economies, and thus that it should not have been involved in the world economic depression though in fact it fell into a deep economic slump. This article shows that China's economic slump of the early 1930s was partly related to the great depression of the major industrial countries of the West but also had other causes. China's depression was also related to Asia, especially to the development of Japan as the crux of the Asian trading network. This article thus illuminates the close and intimate relationships between the Asian economy and the world economy on the one hand, while on the other illustrates the differences between the Asian economy and the world economy. The great world depression's impact on Asia most probably primarily reflected certain regional features of this world-wide economic crisis, an aspect that has been neglected in past studies. Before the 1930s, the greater China economic sphere, with numerous small economic spheres encircling it, virtually dominated the Asian economy. With Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai, and other major ports for transit goods, these smaller economic spheres maintained certain economic relationships with China on the one hand, while the same also serving as nodes in an international network. European merchants similarly made use of Chinese trading spheres in East Asia, forming a transit goods and finance center based in Hong Kong and Singapore for numerous smaller economic spheres situated between the Gulf of Bengal and the South and East Seas. In the 1930s, however, Japan actively expanded its exports, using direct trade routes to maintain close connections with various locations in Asia. This resulted in an overwhelming position for Japanese goods there and finally integrated these various smaller economic spheres into its imperial economic sphere. Japan's strategy not only deprived China of traditional markets for its goods, but also greatly reduced traditional sales of goods imported from Europe and America. This led to the emergence and decline of the two trading networks and routes referred to here, and also to the disintegration of the Greater China economic sphere and the subsequent disappearance of the previously-existing smaller economic spheres. The shift in the Asian economy from the Greater China economic sphere, which consisted of multiple economic and trading spheres, to that of Japan's imperialistic economic sphere which was monopolistic, aggravated the consequences of China's economic depression. Just at this time China was faced with Japan's emergent imperialism as the center of the Asian economic order was decisively transferred from China to Imperial Japan. Many Western scholars held the view that the silver policy of the United States in the 1930s contributed to the outflow of large amounts of silver from China, which then severely harmed its economy plunging it into the world economic depression. In the 1930s we also saw the replacement of the United Kingdom by the U. S. to become the most influential country in Asia's global economic order. It is true that the silver policy of the U. S., now China's largest trading partner, importantly contributed to China's economic depression; however, this did not mean that Japan, as the second largest trading partner of China, had no role in affecting China's economic crisis. This article shows that Japan's marketing strategies for exports in the 1930s, pricing goods cheaply but selling high volumes and thus accepting low profit margins but building a bigger share of the market, hurt Chinese domestic manufacture. Although the total amounts of Japanese trade value were smaller than those of America, Japanese exports were enough to seriously threaten China's ”national goods” and thus form a basic cause of the depression in China's economy. Compared to Western historical views of the silver crisis as a cause of China's economic crisis, the dumping of Japanese goods can be said to be an alternative interpretation from an Eastern historical perspective grounded in Asia.

並列關鍵字

The Great Depression ； Asian economic order ； bloc economy ； Japan ； Greater China economic sphere ； regional economic centers ； theory of colonial industrialization ； theory of intra-Asian trade