遊說對於污染稅的影響

The Political Economy of Pollution Tax

林奇蓉(Chelsea C. Lin) ； 陳怡伶(Yi-Ling Chen)

《農業與經濟》 63期 (2019/12) Pp. 79-103

https://doi.org/10.6181/AGEC.201912_(63).0003

摘要

本文應用Grossman and Helpman（1994）的menu auction模型來探討在廠商可投入技術以降低污染量下，政治遊說對最適污染稅的影響。本文結果顯示，兩利益團體在政治角力下，遊說後最適污染稅的高低須視利益團體的邊際利益大小而定。若環保團體（生產者利益團體）藉由遊說所得到的邊際利益較大時，則遊說後的最適污染稅會高（低）於不存在遊說下的最適污染稅。本文亦討論污染廠商對污染減量技術的投資，結果證明污染廠商之最適污染減量技術投資為正，但污染稅對於廠商投資的影響則不明確。

關鍵字

消費外部性 ； 污染減量技術 ； 遊說 ； 污染稅

並列摘要

This paper applies Grossman and Helpman's (1994) menu-auction model to explore how the interaction of lobbying activities between the environmental interest group and the firms influences the formation of the pollution tax when the firm invests in the clean technology. The results of this paper indicate that the politically-determined pollution tax depends on the relative marginal benefits of the two interest groups. If the environmental interest group (the firm) obtains a greater marginal benefit from lobbying, the politically-determined pollution tax will be higher (lower) than the optimal pollution tax in the absence of lobbying. This paper also discusses the firm's investment in clean technology. The results indicate that the firm's investment in the clean technology will be positive, but the relationship between firm's investment and pollution tax is ambiguous.

並列關鍵字

Consumption externality ； Lobbying ； Environmental policy

參考文獻

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