影響上市櫃公司於公開資訊觀測站自願申報自結損益的決定因素

The Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure of Unaudited Earnings by Listed Company on Market Observation Post System

李建然(Jan-Zan Lee) ； 廖秀梅(Hsiu-Mei Liao) ； 馬心屏(Hsin-Ping Ma)

《臺大管理論叢》 32卷1期 (2022/04) Pp. 127-152

https://doi.org/10.6226/NTUMR.202204_32(1).0004

摘要

本研究以2009年至2017年之上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討在2009年公開資訊觀測站自結損益平台申報制度實施後，影響管理當局自願性申報自結損益的決定因素。此外，本研究將申報自結損益的行為區分為「按月申報」、「按季申報」以及「未申報」三種不同頻率，分析影響管理當局不同揭露頻率的經濟動機。實證結果顯示，當公司有募集資金的需求、公司規模越大、買進並持有異常報酬越低、經營績效越好、非家族企業、董事會規模越大以及獨立董事席次越低，管理當局較願意自願性申報自結損益，而且申報自結損益的頻率亦會越高。

關鍵字

自願性揭露 ； 自結損益 ； 自結損益申報頻率 ； 自結損益申報平台

並列摘要

The study collects data of public listed companies in Taiwan from 2009 to 2017 to examine the determinants that influence these company managements' voluntary disclosures of unaudited earnings after the implementation of the unaudited earnings reporting system on the TSE Market Observation Post System (MOPS). This study further divides the sample into three different disclosure frequencies, namely ＂Monthly,＂ ＂Quarterly,＂ and ＂None,＂ to analyze the economic motivation behind managements' decision-making on disclosure frequency. The empirical results show that companies are more likely to voluntarily disclose their unaudited earnings and have higher disclosure frequency when falling in the following conditions: in the need of raising funds, of larger scales, with lower buy-and-hold abnormal return, showing better operating performance, non-family controlled, with larger board size, and with lower ratio of independent directors.

並列關鍵字

voluntary disclosure ； unaudited earnings ； disclosure frequency of unaudited earnings ； unaudited earnings reporting system

參考文獻

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