- 期刊
半總統制下的總理任命權與政府穩定之研究
The Presidential Power of the Appointment of a Prime Minister and Government Stability in a Semi-presidential System
摘要
總統權力向為半總統制研究者關注之焦點，而在各項權力中，總統對總理的任命權，更經常是評估其憲政角色的關鍵。本文以憲法規範為基礎，嘗試由不同規範方式「再分類」總統的任命總理權，從總統的任命權是否應受到國會同意出發，進一步，再對國會行使同意權的通過門檻進行程度區分，從規範來區分四類閣揆任命權的內容：第一類，總統單獨任命總理；第二類，總統任命總理需經國會同意；第三類，總統任命總理需經國會同意，並且被指定是國會多數提名之人選。第四類，總統任命總理需經國會同意，並且，任命的完成尚有時間限制，分別以法國、羅馬尼亞、保加利亞、斯洛維尼亞等四個同為「總理總統制」的國家作為案例代表。其次，在依變項的設定上，本文控制府會關係這個變項，同以四個國家的「共治」時期，來分析不同憲政規範的周延程度度，是否影響到總統、總理、國會之間的「負責」與「制衡」關係，具體指標包含：倒閣的發生否、內閣的存續力、總統立法權的展現程度，來闡釋任命權對憲政穩定度之影響。本文發現，國會有無對總理任命案之同意權，並不直接與半總統制穩定度相關，然共治期間的國會能否藉同意權來確保半總統制穩定，則與規範方式有相當關連。
並列摘要
Presidential power has always been the focus of research on Semi-presidentialism, and among the various powers, whether the President has the substantive power to appoint the Prime Minister is often the key to assessing his constitutional role. Based on the Constitutional norms, this article attempts to ＂reclassify＂ the President's power to appoint the Prime Minister from the degree of the regulations, starting from the President's appointing Premier power whether it needs consent from the Congress. And further, distinguish the degree of threshold appointment which the Congress exercises the Cabinet Appointment/Consent Power. There are four categories of the Cabinet Appointment/Consent Power in terms of rigorous standards. In the first category, the president has direct power to appoint the Prime Minister: In the second category, the Congress exercises Cabinet Appointment/Consent Power : In the third category, the Prime Minister is designated as the candidate nominated by the majority of Congress: In the fourth category, there is a time limit for the completion of the appointment of the Prime Minister. We choose four countries with Premier-presidentialism systems as cases: France, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia. Second, in the setting of dependent variables, this article controls the government association relationship with this variable, taking the period of ＂Cohabitation＂ in four countries to analyze whether the degree of different constitutional norms affects the relationship between ＂responsibility＂ and ＂checks and balances＂ between the president, the prime minister, and the parliament. The index involve: does the Congress has exercises No-confidence Vote? Government durability and degree of the President's legislative Power exercise those explain the influence of Cabinet Appointment Power on the stability of government. The study found, whether Congress has the Cabinet Appointment/Consent Power is not directly related to the stability of a Semi-presidentialism system. However, the Congress has exercised the Cabinet Appointment/Consent Power to ensure the stability of Semi-presidentialism during the Cohabitation is related to the degree of the Cabinet Appointment Power of the Constitution regulations.
參考文獻
延伸閱讀
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