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論德沃金的民主理論:一個憲政自由主義的解讀

On Ronald Dworkin's Theory of Democracy: A Reading of Constitutional Liberalism

摘要


本文旨在從憲政自由主義的角度,來闡釋德沃金的民主理論。照一般的理解,德沃金的政治哲學是以「平等」爲核心的理論,然而,平等自由主義如何落實在具體的民主生活中?在憲政架構下的民主實踐是可能的嗎?審視德沃金這幾年的著述,本文認爲,晚近德沃金藉由對憲法的道德解讀,所開展出的憲政自由主義,實已證成一套民主理論:亦即不是多數民主,而是憲政民主-他稱爲「夥伴民主」-才是值得追求的實質民主理念,因爲這種民主能實現德沃金心中所期盼的「人民主權」、「公民平等」與「民主對話」這三個政治理想。 全文分爲三個部分來討論。第一,在理論基礎上,一方面勾勒德沃金的法學要旨,並說明平等、憲法與民主的關係與連結;另一方面指出人性尊嚴作爲政治論辯的共同基礎,如何首尾貫穿在德沃金的民主論據中,這是當前論者較少著墨的,卻是理解德沃金後期思想的重要線索。第二,在理論證立上,本文嘗試回答兩個重要的哲學問題:(1)司法審查是不民主嗎?(2)憲政主義與民主是衝突的嗎?以此指出德沃金民主理論的特徵與夥伴民主的內容。第三,在理論批判上,藉由哈伯瑪斯的審議民主來對照德沃金的論點:夥伴民主突顯了憲政結構的重要性,但也透露出陳義過高的理論困境。透過批判與對話,我們對德沃金的民主理論做了整體的評價與省思。

並列摘要


This article attempts to explore Ronald Dworkin's democracy from the perspective of constitutional liberalism. The core of Dworkin's political philosophy is ”equality”. However, is egalitarian liberalism possible in democratic life? Or what is democracy in a constitutional practice sense? In reviewing his works, I argue that Dworkin has not only developed constitutional liberalism but has also justified a theory of democracy based on a moral reading of the constitution, that is, not a majoritarian democracy but rather a constitutional democracy, or a ”partnership democracy” in Dworkin's words. Such a democracy is really a genuine democracy because there are three political ideals: ”popular sovereignty,” ”citizen equality,” and ”democratic discourse” in partnership democracy. There are three parts to my arguments. First, in the theoretical grounds for democracy, I discuss the essentials of Dworkin's jurisprudence and the relationships among equality, the constitution and democracy, and the two principles of human dignity as common ground in the political debate to reveal the arguments underlying Dworkin's democratic reasoning. For Dworkin, it is a very important clue that might otherwise be ignored. Secondly, in justifying the theory of democracy, this article answers two philosophical questions in order to analyze what does Dworkin mean of partnership democracy and its characteristics: (1) Is a judicial review undemocratic? (2) Is there any conflict between constitutionalism and democracy? Finally, based on Jürgen Habermas' deliberative democracy that criticizes Dworkin's thought, I think that partnership democracy signifies the importance of the constitutional regime but is too utopian. In challenging Dworkin's arguments, this article evaluates and critically reflects the whole of Dworkin's theory of democracy.

參考文獻


陳閔翔(2009)。德沃金「人性尊嚴原則」之理論意涵與實踐應用。政治與社會哲學評論。29,195-249。
吳秀瑾(2009)。政治與社會哲學評論
王鵬翔(2008)。法律、融貫性與權威。政治與社會哲學評論。24,23-68。
楊惠君譯、胡全威校(2008)。民主憲政。政治與社會哲學評論。24,1-22。
陳宜中(2007)。仇恨言論不該受到管制嗎?反思德沃金的反管制論證。政治與社會哲學評論。23,47-87。

被引用紀錄


莊季凡(2016)。司法裁量無可避免?-以德沃金法理論反思台灣司法判決〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU201603488
陳閔翔(2010)。論Ronald Dworkin法政哲學中的民主觀:建構、爭議與批判〔博士論文,國立臺灣師範大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0021-1610201315201831

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