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立法委員在委員會發言訴求取向之探究:以第七屆立法院為例

An Investigation of Congressional Speech Purposes: the Case Study of the Seventh Legislative Yuan

摘要


國內國會研究對於立法委員發言甚少有系統性的實證研究,然而立委發言被《立法院職權行使法》認定是正式的立法行為之一,與表決同等重要。本文從探討立委發言開始,並聚焦在立委發言的三種訴求取向:政黨、選民與資訊。探究這三種訴求取向的文獻大抵在討論一個主要的研究問題:立法過程中究竟多數黨黨團會不會挾人數優勢,進行以服務選區為導向的「分配立法」?為了回答這個問題,兩大學派-「政黨中心論」與「綜合立法模式」-提出不同論點,並衍生出兩組競爭假設。本文的發現與政黨中心論者Cox與McCubbins的論述一致,他們認為多數黨黨團的影響力高時,會帶動更多選民考量的問政。本文蒐集選制改革後的「第七屆立法院」共八個會期的立委發言做為研究對象,依變項為立委發言的訴求取向-包括政黨、選民與資訊三種,主要自變項包括以個別立委「政黨團結度」測量的「黨團影響力」與以「黨團協商案」測量的法案「議題顯著性」。本文除了是國內少數探究立委發言的量化研究,同時也是國內首篇比較Maltzman模式與Cox與McCubbins模式詮釋力的論文。

關鍵字

資訊 選民 政黨 綜合立法 立委發言

並列摘要


Taiwan's legislative scholars rarely investigate congressional speech. Congressional speech is legally defined as legislative behavior, just as much as roll call vote. I attempt to look into congressional speech and investigate three targets of it- party, constituency, and information. Previous literature that deals with congressional speech targets start from one major question: does the majority caucus in Legislative Yuan help its members to engage in distributional lawmaking? In answering this question, there are two competing schools of thought. The first is Maltzman's "conditional model," and the second is Cox and McCubbins' "party government model." The two models prescribe two competing hypotheses, respectively. I found that Cox and McCubbins' model is correct regarding the association between the majority party strength and the pro-earmark speech. As far as the research design, I collected the legislative reports of the seventh Legislative Yuan, which includes eight sessions. These reports cover the information on many legislative speeches held by individual legislators. The dependent variable is the purposes of each of these speeches, and the independent variables include the majority party strength, issue salience and many others. This paper is by far the most complete investigation of congressional speech in Taiwan's lawmaking literature. It is also the first paper in Chinese that deals with the theoretical debate between Maltzman and Cox and McCubbins regarding their views on the interaction of the party, constituency, and information in congressional committees.

並列關鍵字

Information constituency party conditional speech

參考文獻


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