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多重哲學典範:解決黃光國難題依據的實在論

Multiple Philosophical Paradigms: The Basis of Realism for Answering the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem

摘要


本文仔細檢視黃光國撰寫《社會科學的理路》該書的各種觀點,並對照其後來出版的《儒家文化系統的主體辯證》,本希望藉此梳理其有關科學哲學的脈絡,卻發現黃光國在書中提出「多重哲學典範」作為空的架構,本身不具任何實質哲學思想,雖然其本來目的旨在容納各種具有實在論意義的哲學典範來探索「關係主義的研究法」,然該內容混雜著哲學根本性質或哲學應用方法的思想,不見得與實在論有關,更有反對方法論的詮釋學,將其共融於一爐,只會讓人混淆且無所適從,更無法促成「生命世界」與「微觀世界」的雙向循環。黃光國想覓出深藏在人類心智裡的「結構」,然而結構思想並不等於結構主義,本文反對黃光國將結構主義擺放在多重哲學典範的核心位置,並覺得建構實在論的問題在「不討論實在的討論實在」;批判實在論的問題則在「討論不同於實在的實在」,兩者都在閃躲討論實在本身,使得其無法回應中華文化本質具有「天人合一」的思想傳統,架構具有現代意義的華人本土社會科學。如果解決黃光國難題可依據的實在論,已經由論證確知不能由前面任何單一思想來回答,本文覺得不如回到心體論,由該主軸出發,修正與消融建構實在論與批判實在論,將其由領會心體展開「語言性的外推」,架構出有關心體的「微觀世界」,並將各種森羅萬象的微觀世界做個整合,從而發展出有關心體觀念更縝密的「建構的實在」,意即「心體論」就在其間被建構完成,從而才能真正落實「本體性的外推」。並且,本文承認並使用先驗論證的理則結構,主張心體研究的對象既不是經驗主義的現象,更不是人類強加於現象的建構,其面對著持續存在,並在我們知識外獨立運作的實在結構,這個結構就是存在自身的心體;接著,我們在真實的範疇裡,發現「自我」本質是個「人天共構主體」,如果能不經社會習染,讓自我恢復自性,則這個人天共構主體產生往外面對己身外的現象,兩者交融就會變成客體的能量,客體的能量啟動後發生的事件就是真實;最後,在事實的範疇裡,進而發現人如果不只有前面六識,更具有自性這個阿賴耶識,則我們看見的事實會來自於真實,且真實來自於心體,生命具有這種多層次的開展視野,才能真正完成「靈性轉向」,當解決黃光國難題不啻同時在解決李約瑟難題,就使得心理學的科學革命有機會帶來中華學術的質性蛻變。

並列摘要


This article provides a detailed review of the perspective presented in the books Indigenous Social Science and The Subjective Argument of the Confucian Cultural System by Hwang Kwang-Kuo in order to clarify the philosophy of science Hwang used to support his arguments. In fact, we discovered that the hollow structure of Hwang's "Multiple philosophical paradigms" have nothing to do with any fictionality the original purpose of Hwang's books was to address the philosophical paradigms relevant to realism in order to explore the research method of relationalism. The Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem is the question of how to complete a paradigm shift in social science research methodology. I point out that Hwang's argument reflects the fundamental nature and methodology of philosophy and may not be related to realism at all. Hwang's argument cannot facilitate the bidirectional circulation of the life world and the micro world as Hwang claimed. Hwang aimed to explore the structure of the human mind, but structural thought is not equivalent to structuralism. I oppose Hwang's idea that structuralism is at the center of multiple philosophic paradigms. I believe that the problem with constructive realism is that it discusses realism without discussing realism, and that the problem of critical realism is that it is a discussion of realism that differs from realism. Both forms of realism avoid discussing realism itself. Neither responds to Chinese culture, which has an intellectual tradition that supports the idea that humans are an integral part of nature. Neither can support construction of indigenous social sciences in Chinese societies. If the basis for applying realism as an answer to the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem is validated by the argument that no previous ideologies are appropriate, I would rather return to nousism. Chinese thought develop a realism that is completely different from idealism and materialism. For Chinese thought, the controversy between idealism and materialism is meaningless, because the origin of the universe is not in ideal and material, but in the nous. It is a long research tradition and thinking style, so that I use "nousism" to call the study of the inner world of human mind. Starting there, constructive realism and critical realism can be re-evaluated with linguistic strangification so that both ideologies are understood to pertain not only to the soul, but also to the body. The micro worlds of the body and soul can be constructed, and various types of micro worlds can be integrated to develop a more sophisticated "constructed realism". Only then can the ontological strangification be consolidated. I apply the logical structure of transcendental arguments and beliefs to argue that the objective of studying Heaven and humans is neither the phenomenology of empiricism nor a construction that humans place on phenomena. An independently operating and continuously existing structure of realism lies just beyond human knowledge. The nature of the ego is to connect with Heaven. Where social habits can be ignored, the ego can return to its nature. When humans connect with Heaven it creates a phenomenon beyond the physical. People may possess not only six senses, but also ālayavijñāna (alaya consciousness) with the self. Truth comes from truth, which ultimately comes from the unity of Heaven and humans. This argument answers the Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem, and also Needham's Problem. I propose that Hwang Kwang-Kuo's perspective on spiritual realism and historical realism inclines towards subjectivism as both realisms are geared towards nous. Since nous has the characteristic of Heaven and humans united as one, then humans and Heaven would originally have been conceptualized spiritually with natural flow and communication, and corporally as the self-transformation of the ego. This nature is more precisely labeled "intersubjectivity". If life is faced through self-nous and people can have their own insight into Heaven, relations, objects, and the self as they co-exist in their lives, then they develop a variety of I-thou relations. In response to the assertion that it is dangerous to value nous in an empirical life, I note that the nousism of Chinese thought is not the idealism and materialism of Western philosophy. If the nous is neither too familiar nor too distant from experience, then it should be able to go beyond experience to yield a corresponding experience. If people respect and accept the existence of deities (arising from traditional customs), but feel that it is a problem to admit the existence of nous (arising from traditional academics), it is a double standard. Hwang Kwang-Kuo provided an argument for how to complete a paradigm shift in social science research methodology. When scholars directly rethink the definition of science and accept the idea that systematic is scientific, and provide rigorous arguments for the presuppositions of indigenous social science, they create a scientific micro world. Confucianism has long been making spiritual issues into academic ones by converting faith for God into a study of the self. Confucianism is not the mere task of understanding culture in the process of human growth, but of seeking the common source idea behind different religious teachings. This cross-religious discussion places rationality in conscience. Only because the original reconciliation and symbiosis of human civilization was beneficial did Chinese thought become the thought of East Asia. If scholars continue to explore its modern significance, there is an opportunity to develop Chinese thought into a more mature Chinese indigenous social science. If scholars can then accurately relate different cultures by understanding them correctly, academic contents can become universal knowledge.

參考文獻


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