This paper assesses the U.S.' sudden withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 from a strategic perspective, positing that the decision constituted a countermeasure to the threat of medium-range missiles from China and Russia. The U.S. believes that Russia has failed to abide by the treaty and that continued adherence restricts the U.S.' ability to develop its own medium-range missiles. Withdrawal gave the U.S. an opportunity to express its dissatisfaction with the treaty while intentionally forcing China to join the INF, thereby providing countermeasures against the threat from China. This paper argues that while U.S. withdrawal from the INF escalated conflicts, it can also be understood as a U.S. strategy of "one step back, two steps forward," in which the U.S. is seeking to reconstruct a tripartite treaty so that it can hold China and Russia in check.