當代一位審議民主理論家John Dryzek曾經宣稱,約在1990年左右,民主理論研究領域上展現出一個明確而強烈的「審議轉向」(deliberative turn):在轉向之前,訴諸公民的「偏好加總」;在轉向之後,則憑藉公民的「審議能力或機會」。這個眾所矚目的轉向宣稱,通常結合著「加總模型」與「審議民主」兩個對立的民主模型的見解,從而輕易導致兩個值得商榷的論點。第一,1990年之前的民主理論,「都是」加總模型,自此之後則「全是」審議民主。第二,在「正當性」的強弱比較上,訴諸公民之「偏好加總」的加總模型,遠不如憑藉公民之「審議能力或機會」的審議民主。依據筆者的淺見,這兩個論點確實尚有商榷之處。本文企圖透過著名政治學家Robert Dahl的「多元民主理論」,而來論述筆者這一淺見。本文的解析,大體上具有兩個主要目的。首先,指明Dahl所建構的「多元民主理論」,非但不是「加總模型」,反而可以相容於「審議民主」,甚至也包含審議民主理論家十分珍視的「公民審議」。其次,指出「多元民主理論」可為時下風行的「公民審議」,奠定一個鞏固的理論基礎。為了能夠達成這兩個主要目的,本文的解析,將從「立論基礎」、「民主判準」、以及「民主制度」等層面逐一進行。
John Dryzek, a deliberative democracy theorist, has said that around 1990 the theory of democracy took a definite deliberative turn. Prior to that turning point, the democratic ideal was seen mainly in terms of aggregation of preferences; after that turning point, many believed that the essence of democratic legitimacy should be sought in citizen deliberation. Combining two contrasted models of democracy, an aggregative model of democracy and a model of deliberative democracy, this popular and influential claim of a deliberative turning point in democratic theory led smoothly to two points. First, prior to 1990, all democratic theories were aggregative models of democracy; since that turning point, all democratic theories have been models of deliberative democracy. Second, on a scale of legitimacy, an aggregative model of democracy is weaker than a model of deliberative democracy. In my opinion, these two points are questionable. This article seeks to present a systematic interpretation of Robert Dahl's theory of polyarchal democracy by examining these two points. This paper analyzes the theoretical foundations, democratic criteria, and democratic institutions in exploring this question.
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