Uruguay is a "contemporary achiever" in terms of transparency, a country that only recently has come to be considered an open access regime and has registered modest economic achievements over the last thirty-five years. Using the case of Uruguay, this essay shows how a change in party system competitive equilibrium-from a system based on clientelistic competition to one grounded in programmatic competition-is the driver that transformed Uruguay into an open access regime, under which politicians' corrupt behavior is penalized by citizens. Anticorruption legislation in Uruguay did not bring about this change; rather, it was a product of this change. This explains the means and the reach of the new system of norms, which is not substantially stricter, but is more effective in its implementation than in other countries in the region. These reforms were not instituted in response to a crisis of legitimacy like those that motivated other countries to approve such norms, but rather in response to the need to regulate political practices and the bureaucracy in the new context of programmatic competition.