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競租者能力差異性對於二維度競租活動的影響

The Impact of Rent-Seekers' Heterogeneity in Ability on Two-Dimensional Rent-Seeking Activities

摘要


為了探討競租者能力異質性對於二維度競租活動的影響,本文參考Faria et al.(2014)的二維度競租投入模型,同時依循過往異質性競租分析文獻的設定方式,建立一個存在競租者能力差異的二維度競租分析模型。不同於既有文獻關於:能力異質性擴大將會使得社會競租浪費水準下降的分析結果,本文發現在本文所建立的分析架構下,若政府政策租利彈性夠大,則兩位’競租者間的競租能力差異擴大,將有可能會使社會整體競租浪費水準增加而非下降。

並列摘要


In order to explore the impact of rent-seekers' heterogeneity in ability on two-dimensional rent-seeking activities. By referring to the two-dimensional rent-seeking model in Faria et al. (2014) and the models of heterogeneity rent-seeking. We construct a two-dimensional rent-seeking model with rent-seekers' heterogeneity in ability. Different from previous studies' finding about the increasing of rent-seekers' heterogeneity in ability will decrease social rent-seeking effort. Our finding shows that when the elasticity of policy rent is high enough, the increasing of two rent-seekers' heterogeneity in ability may increase social overall rent-seeking effort.

參考文獻


Baik, K. H. 1994. “Effort Levels in Contests with Two Asymmetric Players,” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 61, pp. 367-378.
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L. and Konrad, K. A. 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking, Volumes 1 and 2, (Heidelberg: Springer).
Faria, J. R., Mixon, Jr., F. G., Caudill, S. B. and Wineke, S. J. 2014. “Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony,” Games, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 116-126.
Gradstein, M. 1991. “Intensity of Competition in Strategic Contests,” Mimeo. (BenGurion University, Beersheva).
Hillman, A. L. and Riley, J. G. 1989. “Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers,”Economics and Politics, vol.1, no. 3, pp. 17-39.

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