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以擁擠性公共財為競逐標的之二維度競租分析

Two-Dimensional Rent-Seeking for Congested Public Goods

摘要


透過結合Faria et al.(2014)的二維度競租投入模型以及Edwards(1990)擁擠性公共財分析架構之設定方式,本文建立了一個標的為擁擠性地方公共財的二維度競租分析模型。利用本文所建立的模型,我們深入分析地區居民人數分配狀況、地區居民人數、擁擠參數以及擴大租利努力投入影響效果參數等因素變動,對於二維度競租活動所可能產生的影響效果。有別於Katz et al.(1990)的公共財競租分析有關於:競租活動不受地區居民人數以及地區人數分配狀況影響的分析結論。本文發現在競租標的公共財存在擁擠性的情況下,總擴大租利與總相互競租兩個維度的努力投入水準,都會隨著兩個地區間的人數分配趨向越來越不平均而增加。又當兩個區域居民人數等比例提高時,總擴大租利與總相互競租兩個維度的努力投入水準,則是都會因此而降低。

並列摘要


By referring to the two-dimensional rent-seeking model in Faria et al. (2014) and the model of Congested public goods proposed by Edwards (1990). We construct a model of two-dimensional rent-seeking for congested public goods. Using our model, we investigate the impact of population, population distribution, congestion parameter and elasticity of central government grants on two-dimensional rent-seeking activities. Different from traditional public goods rent-seeking studies' finding about the population and population distribution will not affect rent-seeking waste. Our finding shows that the more uneven population distribution, the higher social waste will cause by two-dimensional rent-seeking activities. Moreover, when regional population increase in the same proportion, the social waste of two-dimensional rent-seeking activities will decrease.

參考文獻


翁仁甫,2006,「標的為擁擠性公共財的競租分析」,經社法治論叢,第38期,頁211-238。
Bergstrom, T. C. and Goodman, R. P. 1973. “Private demands for public goods,”American Economic Review, vol. 63, pp. 280~296.
Borcherding, T. E. and Deacon, R. T. 1972. “The demand for the services of non-federal governments,” American Economic Review, vol. 62, pp. 891~901.
Cheikbossian, G. 2008. “Rent-seeking, spillovers and the benets of decentralization,” Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 63, pp. 217~228.
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L. and Conrad, K. A. 2008. Forty years of research on rent seeking, Volumes 1 and 2 (Heidelberg: Springer).

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