A Study on Antitrust Merger Regulation in USA from the Viewpoint of a Recent Case

林秀彌(Shuya Hayashi)

《東亞法學評論》 1卷2期 (2010/09) Pp. 57-82

https://doi.org/10.29432/EALJ.201009.0004

並列摘要

This article considers about a recent development of merger regulation in the U.S. antitrust law, focusing on the Oracle Case (2004). The theme of theoretical considerations of merger regulation is one of the most challenging and controversial. The competitive impacts of certain type of corporate strategies such as mergers can often be evaluated only after careful, case-by-case analysis, deliberate review must be undertaken to ensure that procompetitive, efficiency enhancing mergers are not chilled under the threat of possible antitrust law enforcement. We must avoid such kind false positive regulations. In light of this, economic analysis in merger regulation will be crucially important to sophisticate actual case review.
In order to sophisticate actual merger case review, it is necessary to allow persons concerned with industry, academia and government to share the common understanding on the sophisticated way of merger review by forming a broad consensus on sound economic analysis and other matters used for analysis, periodically analyzing the status of antitrust merger regulation and making the results of analysis available to the public.
This article firstly sets significance of economic analysis in merger regulation, and secondly, it analyzes market definition in merger regulation by summarizing the Oracle Case, and finally, the article examines the challenges that the merger regulation face in antitrust enforcement.

並列關鍵字

Antitrust law ； Merger regulation ； Economic analysis ； Market definition ； Oracle Case