遺棄罪立法正當性之檢討

A Review of the legitimacy of abandonment

郭釗偉(Chao-Wei Kuo)

指導教授 ： 黃榮堅

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.00046

摘要

遺棄罪作為一種獨立的犯罪類型似乎和絕大多數人的法感十分契合，但其遭逢的理論困境的複雜程度實在令人咋舌。本文耙梳、整理了我國學說、實務對於遺棄罪的見解，認為遺棄罪的根本問題有三：一，遺棄罪的保護法益為何？二，危險犯立法模式的正當性基礎何在？三，殺人罪與遺棄罪可不可能區分？如能區分，係透過主觀不法區分還是透過義務來源區分？

　　以刑事不法行為的定義為基礎，本文認為刑法上的「危險」概念應採主觀危險理論，故刑法上危險的判斷對象應為「行為時，行為人主觀上所認知的心理事實，以及行為人依其能力與所知事實所做的實害預測」，而判斷標準則係「容許風險」。自主判斷權限代表每個人各自的個性多元發展與生活方式，此一效益雖是不能輕易退讓的高度福祉，但自主判斷的範圍則會隨著可能侵害利益與風險的大小做調整。至於決定每個人個性發展空間範圍有多大的標準，是「社會總體功利」，以維持每個人個性發展空間之間的衡平關係。

　　危險犯的正當性應建立於對難以測定的利益侵害範圍的擬制評價，是一種適用於超個人法益犯罪類型的技術性未遂規定。至於刑法上的危險只有一種，即「超越容許風險的危險」，因此抽象危險犯、具體危險犯的實質內涵應屬相同。又為了不違背罪責原則，所謂抽象危險不可能僅為立法者的動機，仍必須委由法官審查行為時的具體環境因素判斷有無危險，故抽象危險犯實質內涵亦同於具體危險性犯。因此，本文認為實質上僅有一種危險犯：具體危險性犯。而所謂的危險故意本質上依然是一種實害故意，不能以立法者或專家的判斷予以取代。

　　透過立法沿革以及對德國法制史的觀察，遺棄罪搖擺於義務違反與生命危險之間的罪質，係造成其解釋上諸多困難的根源。為了明確定性遺棄罪的罪質，本文認為遺棄罪的保護法益僅為生命，至於義務違反說（扶養義務請求權、國家福利資源的耗費）因為不符合刑法體系或有違利益衡平而被排除。遺棄罪既非超個人法益犯罪，若還是以行為人的實害認知為前提，將使遺棄罪難以同時兼顧規範必要性與正當性，也因此造成遺棄故意與殺人故意的區分困境。如欲以義務來源做區分，由於本文認為刑法作為義務的唯一正當性基礎是危險前行為，因此也難以藉此區分遺棄罪與殺人罪，如此將使遺棄罪完全失去規範意義。最後，在總結遺棄罪在理論上的困境及其正當性疑慮之後，本文也分別以兩條進路對遺棄罪指出可能的限縮解釋方向與立法論建議，希望能為實務運作提供些微的幫助。

關鍵字

遺棄 ； 危險犯 ； 容許風險 ； 自主判斷 ； 效益主義 ； 自由主義

並列摘要

As an independent crime type, abandonment seems to correspond with the legal sense of most people, but the complexity of the theoretical dilemma it encounters is astounding. This thesis reviews the theoretical and practical perspectives on the crime of abandonment, and advances three fundamental questions: First, what is the legal interest of abandonment? Second, what is the basis of legitimacy in the legislation of crime of danger (Gefahrdungsdelikt)? And third, are the crime of murder and that of abandonment distinguishable? If yes, are they distinguished by subjective illegality or the source of obligation?

Based on the definition of criminal offense, this thesis holds that subjective risk theory should be adopted regarding the criminal concept of “danger.” Thus, in criminal law, the object of judgment of danger should be “the psychological fact that is subjectively recognized by the person, and the actual harm prediction done by the person according to his or her ability and known facts at the time of the act.” And the criteria of judgment is the “allowed risk.” The autonomous judgment represents the diversity of characteristics and lifestyles, whose efficiency is the lofty well-being not to be easily conceded; however, the range of autonomous judgment would be modified in accordance with possible interest infringement and the extent of risk. As for the space between each one’s characteristic development, it is the “general utility” that determines and maintains its equilibrium.

The legitimacy of the crime of danger should be established on the legal fiction evaluation of unpredictable range of interest infringement. It is a technical attempt regulation applicable to hyper-individual legal interest crime. In criminal law, danger is limited to the “danger that exceeds allowed risk”; hence, the substance of the crime of abstract danger (abstraktes Gefahrdungsdelikt) and that of concrete danger (konkretes Gefahrdungsdelikt) should be equivalent. In order not to violate the principle of responsibility, abstract danger cannot be merely out of the lawmaker’s motivation. Instead, it should be determined by the judge whether danger exists in the specific circumstances at the time of the action; thus, the substance of abstract danger equals that of qualified danger (Eignungsdelikt). As a result, this thesis holds that, substantially, only one type of crime of danger exists – that of qualified danger. The so-called intended danger is, in essence, nonetheless a criminal’s intention to accomplish the criminal result, which cannot be replaced by the lawmakers’ or experts’ judgment.

According to the legislative evolution and the history of German law, the crime of abandonment has oscillated between obligation violation and life danger, which is the source of its interpretive difficulties. In order to clarify the crime nature of abandonment, this thesis claims that the legal interest of abandonment is none other than life. The theory of obligation violation (the claim for support, the waste of nation welfare, etc.) is excluded for not conforming to the criminal law system and/or for violating interest balance. Given that abandonment is not a hyper-individual legal interest crime, if predicated on the person’s real harm recognition, it cannot take into account both normative necessity and legitimacy, thus causing the dilemma in distinguishing intentional abandonment from intentional homicide. If distinguished by the source of obligation, abandonment will completely lose its normativity, since the only basis of legitimacy in the criminal law as obligation, this thesis argues, is the previous act which created the dangerous condition, making it difficult to distinguish abandonment from murder. Finally, after summarizing the dilemma in theory and legitimacy of abandonment, this thesis also points out the possible narrowed interpretive directions and legislative suggestions from two approaches, with the hope to provide slight help for practical operation.

並列關鍵字

abandonment ； crime of danger ； allowed risk ； autonomous judgment ； utilitarianism ； liberalism

參考文獻

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