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  • 學位論文

「流動資本、可移動勞工與經濟地理」之研究

Two Essays on Footloose Capital, Mobile Labor, and Economic Geography

指導教授 : 張康聰
共同指導教授 : 彭信坤(Shin-Kun Peng)

摘要


在新經濟地理的架構下,本研究發展兩個理論模型,以探討在全球化之下,流動性越來越高的兩個生產要素--勞工與資本--兩者的交互作用對於產業聚集分布的影響,並重新檢視其在區域政策上例如補貼競爭的意涵。 首先,為了了解資本流動性究竟是強化或者減緩因跨國移動企業家而形成的產業聚集的影響,本研究在第一個模型中,在雙區域的架構上,合併了文獻上的「移動資本模型」與「移動企業家模型」。結果顯示,這兩個分別由移動資本與移動企業家所驅動的製造業部門間交相影響,形成五種產業分布均衡型態的組合。最有趣的是從本模型可發現資本移動性對於因跨國移動企業家而形成的突發性聚集,扮演著穩定性的角色,減緩其均衡演變出現不連續跳躍的傾向,導致移動企業家所驅動的製造業部門之均衡分歧型態,隨著外生參數的組合,可出現從「亞臨界分歧」到「超臨界分歧」等四種型態。從存在著最大不連續性的「亞臨界分歧」型態到完全連續變化的「超臨界分歧」,正意味著資本的流動性可逐漸削減因為人員遷移所帶來的聚集的劇烈變動。 接著,為了探討異質的勞工流動性對於產業分布以及諸如補貼資本以招商政策的影響,本研究在第二個模型中,以「移動資本模型」為基礎,導入了勞工對於區位偏好的異質性,以及製造業產業內因聚集而產生的外部性(例如外溢效果)。結果顯示因移動資本所驅動的產業分布,其均衡演變的分歧型態,隨著外生參數的組合,也出現從「亞臨界分歧」到「超臨界分歧」等四種型態。勞工基本上追隨資本遷徙,故同樣出現與資本分布相對應的分歧型態或多重均衡延續等現象;然而在資本維持在完全聚集之後,隨著交易成本的降低,勞工則出現分散的趨勢,在交易成本降低到零的情況下,勞工出現對稱分散的分布。以三階段賽局分析此一經濟體系下兩國政府補貼資本的招商競爭,若兩國原始資本稟賦相當,則當交易成本很低的自由貿易環境下,原本是產業完全聚集的核心國將願意提供補貼吸引資本,這補貼水準會訂在令完全邊陲國沒有意願加入補貼競爭的臨界點上,此一補貼難免犧牲了完全核心國本國的福利。至於完全邊陲國雖不提供補貼,以至於無製造業進駐,其福利卻可因其境內資本家之跨境投資享有核心國的補貼而有所提升。隨著貿易自由度降低,在產業聚集離心力相對較強的經濟系統下(例如「超臨界分歧」),完全核心國將逐漸喪失透過補貼留住資本的能力。至於初始條件為部分聚集的補貼決策,原本留駐較多資本的部分聚集之「相對核心國」面對部分聚集之「相對邊陲國」的補貼競爭,一定會流失一些產業,最多只能繼續維持「相對核心國」的地位。而隨著經濟系統變成了產業聚集離心力相對較強的情況下,「相對核心國」同樣逐漸喪失留住資本的能力。另外,勞工在區域福利目標當中所佔的權重也是影響補貼競爭均衡的因素,一旦勞工的權重超過一特定閾值,補貼競爭均衡結果為「相對核心國」毫無抵擋「相對邊陲國」搶奪資本的能力,而從原本的部分聚集之「相對核心國」變成了「完全邊陲國」。

並列摘要


Developing two theoretical models, this study aims to re-examine the role of labor mobility and footloose capital in the development of the ‘new economic geography’ theoretical models, and tries to fill the theoretical gap about the effects of the interactions between these two mobile factors on the distribution of industries and thus, the implications of policies. In order to answer whether capital mobility exacerbates or dampens the agglomerative tendency of footloose entrepreneurs, the first model incorporates a footloose-capital (FC) with a footloose-entrepreneur (FE) manufacturing industry based on a tractable analytical structure with two identical regions. This model shows that these two sectors interact with each other and features five types of equilibrium configurations. Most interestingly, this study finds that the mobility of physical capital plays a stabilizing role in the catastrophic agglomeration caused by footloose entrepreneurs. The bifurcation form of the FE-sector changes sequentially from ‘subcritical’, ‘supercritical with big jumps’, ‘supercritical with small jumps’, and to ‘supercritical without jumps’ along with the decreasing expenditure share or the increasing substitution elasticity of the FE-sector relative to that of the FC-sector. Different bifurcation forms not only mean different compositions of stable equilibria, but also imply different evolutionary trajectories of stable equilibria, namely, either ‘catastrophically’ or ‘gradually’. In fact, the ‘subcritical’ bifurcation form has the biggest ‘jump’ among these four forms. Therefore, the sequential changes, from ‘subcritical’ to ‘supercritical without jumps’, display the vanishing processes of discontinuous agglomeration evolutions. In the second model, to examine the effects of heterogeneous labor mobility on the distribution of industries and analyze the subsidy policy for attracting firms, this study develops an analytically solvable new economic geography model, which incorporates heterogeneous locational preferences and intra-industry externality into the footloose capital model. Associated with such two sources of agglomeration forces, the spatial economy exhibits various bifurcation forms, from ‘supercritical’ to ‘subcritical’ patterns, which depends on the exogenous parameters. Following the equilibrium allocation of capital, the equilibrium distribution of labor also shows alternative patterns with smooth shifts or discontinuous jumps as well as hysteresis. When capital is completely concentrated, labor re-disperses along with the increasing trade freeness, and finally becomes symmetrically dispersed when the trade freeness reaches 1. On the examination of the subsidy competition, the full/partial core region's ability to host capital in its region is getting worse when the dispersion force is getting relatively stronger. In addition, the share of labor in the welfare measurement determines the equilibrium outcomes in the subsidy competition. When this share exceeds a critical threshold, the original full/partial core region will convert to full periphery after the subsidy. Therefore, this study provides a more general insight regarding the effects of the relative strength of the dispersion force to the agglomeration force on the equilibrium outcomes of subsidy competition in the spatial economy.

參考文獻


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