無過失責任與過失責任制度在信用品市場的比較

Credence Goods Market: Strict Liability vs. Negligence Liability

蕭登元(Deng-Yuan Shiau)

指導教授 ： 蔡崇聖

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2019年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201902462

摘要

本文想要研究的在信用品市場裡，責任制度如何影響專家的行為。替消費者診斷需求並且提供服務的專家有可能以過度服務的形式欺騙消費者。我們發現在無過失責任之下，相同服務的價格都高於過失責任之下的價格，而過度服務的行為是更為盛行的。除此之外，我們還證明出了在社會福利的觀點上，過失責任的制度比無過失責任來得好；但是從消費者剩餘的觀點上，我們發現無過失責任有時候會比過失責任來得更好。之後我們進一步分析當有行家的消費者出現時會如何影響專家過度服務的行為以及不同的市場結構會如何影響信用品市場。

關鍵字

信用品 ； 專家服務 ； 責任制度 ； 過度醫療

並列摘要

This paper analyzes how liability rule influences the expert’s behavior in credence goods market. The expert, who diagnoses the consumer’s need and then provides the treatment to the consumer, may defraud the consumer in the form of overtreatment. Our results find that the price of the same treatment is higher under strict liability than under negligence liability. The overtreatment behavior is more prevailing under strict liability. Moreover, we show that from the perspective of social welfare, negligence liability rule is weakly better than strict liability rule. However, strict liability rule can sometimes be better than negligence liability rule from the perspective of consumer surplus. We further analyzes how the existence of connoisseur consumer affects the expert’s propensity to engage in overtreatment and how different market structures impact the credence goods market.

並列關鍵字

credence goods ； expert service ； liability ； overtreatment

參考文獻

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