委託代理原則於水資源調配理論模型之建構與應用

台灣地區已大量開發，用水量連年上升，且欲取得新的水資源供給困難，再加上環保意識的興起，水資源管理日顯重要。本研究欲委託代理原則探討水資源分配之議題，藉由探討休耕補助條款及乾旱時期水資源移用補償價格等政策管理工具，在現制下增加水資源之使用效率。本研究主要於利用委託代理原則建立一水資源分配模型，模型中有一名委託者（中央政府）及兩名代理者（農業及工業部門）；而就時間分類上本模型分為兩期，分別設農業部門插秧前為第一期，插秧後則為第二期，農業部門僅有在第二期有所產出，而工業部門則是在兩期皆有所產出；同時在模型條件內有(1)委託者與代理者間存在資訊不對稱。(2)各代理者具有自利行為。(3)代理者為有限理性。(4)兩代理者間沒有任何的資訊交流。(5)假設供水對委託者而言為損益平衡。(6)不考慮水資源建設之長期成本等六項基本假設。本文就委託代理架構下所建構之模型來討論代理者於各情境之用水行為、委託者對於其效用的偏好、以及受政策影響下之效用變化，並進一步加入降雨之不確定性，探討不確定降雨對模型架構之影響。研究結果之政策建議有三項：(1)重新檢驗目前的停灌休耕補助價格的合理性；(2)乾旱時期移用水補償價格可能偏高，並應考慮取消其相對於借水量的上升所伴隨的單位價格加乘；(3)盡量避免公告停灌休耕措施，若不得已而為之，則應盡量減少借水量以降低因為緊急借水所造成的多餘成本。

關鍵字

委託代理理論；資訊不對稱；水權；乾旱用水移用補償；水資源政策

並列摘要

Recently, incentive approaches have drawn more attention in water resources management. This kind of schemes is more socio-politically acceptable comparing to traditional top-down, central control approaches. For the practice of incentive approach for water resources management, the authority (principal) should design the regulation to ensure the provision of appropriate incentives so stakeholders (agent) act in the way assigned by principals. Ignoring the potential uncertainty could lead the wrong decision making and water resource policy failure. This study applies principal-agent theory to discuss the interaction/behaviors of different stakeholders in water allocation problem. By discussing several political and managerial approaches such as the compensation for fallowing and the water transfer in drought period, this study aim to increase the efficiency of water usage under existing regulations. A two period dynamic model, pre-transplanting and post-transplanting, is developed to discuss the behavior among a principal (from government) and two agents (from agriculture and industry sectors). The agriculture sector only harvests after the post-transplanting period, but the industry sector can be revenue in both two periods. Under this framework, this thesis discusses agents’ behaviors of using water under different circumstances, the principal’s preferences and utility, and the efficiency changes induced by policies. The uncertainty of rainfall is also considered to investigate the effect on this model. In general, this study suggests as following. 1) The reasonability of the present compensation price for fallowing should be re-examined. 2) The current compensation price for the transfer of water in drought period is possibly over-estimated. The compensation price should not increase with the amount of water transfer. (3) If possible, it should be avoid to emergent announcement of fallowing. If this happens, we should minimize the amount of water transfer to lower the additional cost.

並列關鍵字

Principal-agent model ； asymmetric information ； water authority ； water transfer compensation ； water policy

參考文獻

63.台灣經濟研究院，水權及其移用水量補償標準之訂定（一），1997年。

1.Arrow, K. J. ( 1971). The Theory of Risk Aversion, Theory of Risk Bearing

3.Amit, R. K., & Ramachandran, P. (2010). A fair contract for managing water scarcity. Water Resources Management, 24(6), 1195-1209.

4.Andersen, B., & Henriksen, B., & Spjelkavik, I. (2008). Benchmarking applications in public sector principal-agent relationships. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 15(6), 723-741.

5.Anwandter, L., & Ozuna Jr, T. (2002). Can public sector reforms improve the efficiency of public water utilities? Environment and Development Economics, 7(04), 687-700.

國際替代計量

委託代理原則於水資源調配理論模型之建構與應用

全文下載

主題瀏覽