一氣通下上：清乾隆年間甘肅的蠹捐與冒賑

本文以甘肅捐監冒賑案（以下簡稱甘肅案）為核心，討論甘肅官員如何利用職務之便，藉由操作捐納、賑濟、文書制度，上瞞皇帝，下欺百姓，「一氣通下上」，釀成「從來未有之奇貪異事」。清廷透過文書制度溝通地方，在甘肅日常辦理的捐納、賑濟制度，也都有相關文書的設置，要求地方官員層層上報，除了使朝廷可以掌握地方政務辦理情形外，也同時具有防弊的功能；雍正年間確立的密奏制度，更使皇帝得以進一步掌握地方的實際辦事情形。清朝捐納制度承襲自明朝，用以補充朝廷財政的不足。康、雍兩朝，遇有重大急務皆可奏請開捐，事畢則罷，捐納對象以官員的陞、復、加級為主。乾隆皇帝則時有禁止各省收捐之舉，僅保留戶部常平捐監作為士子入仕的管道；或有兼開戶部、各省捐監時，則維持「在內捐銀、在外捐穀」的運作模式。事實上，開捐有其作用，對朝廷而言，可免去撥運糧食的開支，又可藉由收捐彌補地方財政；對生俊而言，則可以米糧獲得監生資格，亦可藉此儕身宦途。在此番考量下，只要能強化朝廷對地方的控制力，嚴格稽查納捐的環節，開捐仍然可行。另一方面，清朝沿用歷代災賑成規，幾經變革，於乾隆年間正式訂立，將辦理災賑的權力下放各省自行辦理，透過督撫題報與災賑紀錄，使朝廷仍有效掌握各省災賑事宜。雖然在「先事之政」建立完備，但在荒政講求時效的前提下，地方官員仍必須仰賴書吏、衙役協助辦理賑濟事宜。對皇帝而言，此些非屬朝廷正式官員的民人參與在國家制度中，既難以管控又無法懲處。是以乾隆皇帝要求各省重整荒政次序，改以地方基層官員勘災，此時跨道府勘災官員的徵求與派遣，同樣由布政使主持，如此一來，使賑濟制度當中的權力又進一步被收束，集於一人之身。在甘肅案中，省級長官布政使利用檢核地方文書的職權，任意變換文書遞送次序，使一應文冊淪為具文，縱有密奏制度，皇帝仍難以掌握甘肅捐監、辦災的實際情形。不過，在甘肅案爆發後，乾隆皇帝並未針對甘肅案所涉及的相關制度進行調整，而是從嚴懲治涉案官員，並透過宣諭的方式，要求各省督撫嚴飭屬下，掌握各州縣辦事情形，對官僚體系與報捐者重申官場規範，更透過強化與各省督撫的私屬關係，宣示專制權力的控制，展現他獨到的統治技術。

關鍵字

王亶望；捐監；賑濟；文書制度；統治技術

並列摘要

In 1787, many local officials in Gansu, led by Wang Danwang, the Provincial Administration Commissioner (Buzhengshi), embezzled funds by using their posts to manipulate the course of office purchases, famine relief, and the memorial systems. They collaboratively deceived the Emperor and the people, which led to the gravest corruption of the era. The memorial systems were adopted by the Qing government to liaise with their local counterparts. The office purchase and famine relief schemes were also carried out through relevant systems—local officials were required to brief the central administration so that the latter could not only be kept updated in terms of local affairs but also prevent corruption. The ‘secret palace memorial system,’ established during the reign of the Yongzheng Emperor, likewise enabled the Emperor to gather further informations regarding the exact circumstances of the local administration. The office purchase system was inherited from the Ming Dynasty, and effectively improved the Qing government’s fiscal problems. During the reigns of the Kangxi and Yongzheng Emperors, one could apply for office purchase via the memorial systems if emergencies arose. The application would close when the problems were solved. The office purchase system mainly targeted those who sought to upgrade their office or academic titles. The Qianlong Emperor sometimes forbade provincial authorities from conducting any money-based purchase on their own behalf; the grain-based purchase organized by the Ministry of Revenue hence became the only access to the office. The Ministry of Revenue and provincial authorities could also organize a type of office purchase that accepted either baiyin from internal contributors or grain from external sources. This was, in fact, a useful way of purchase: the central administration could not only save the logistical expense for food distribution but also improve local fiscal deficiencies. As for Government Students (shengyuan), they could exchange for National University Student qualifications (jiansheng), which equipped them with the title for joining the ruling class. In light of this, office purchases were still viable provided that they could enhance the power of the central administration to control local provinces, and the processes of the purchase were carefully scrutinized. On the other hand, the Qing government inherited the rules of famine relief from previous generations and officially settled its version after several reforms in the Qianlong period. It authorized local governments to organize their own relief schemes while disaster relief records and the routine memorials of the governors-general (zongdu) and governors (xunfu) effectively kept the central administration updated. Although these preparatory measures were established, local officials still relied on the court officials, yamen clerks (shuli) and runners (yayi), for the sake of efficiency. For the Emperor, the management and punishment of these commoners were quite difficult, given that they were not formally included in the state officialdom system. On account of this, the Qianlong Emperor ordered a reform that demanded local governments reconfigure the priority of famine relief affairs. It became the local officials’ duty to evaluate the disasters’ damage in person while Provincial Administration Commissioner remained in charge of recruiting and dispatching those officials. As a result, the famine relief policy once again led to the concentration of power in one man’s hand. In the case of Gansu, Provincial Administration Commissioner manipulatively exercised his power of reviewing local memorials to willfully rearrange the order of their submission, which undermined the efficiency and purposes of the memorial systems. That is, the Emperor could hardly know the exact situations of office purchase and famine relief in Gansu. Nonetheless, after the Gansu case, the Qianlong Emperor did not seriously consider improving or revamping the relevant administrative systems but instead merely punished those individual officials. He also published a public announcement, demanding provincial governors to manage their officials with the strictest standards so that he could be fully informed of local situations and re-enhance the bureaucratic rules for the applicants of office purchase. Moreover, he exhibited an extraordinary capacity for statecraft by consolidating personal ties with local governors to proclaim his absolutism.