馬克思韋伯與法律研究－一些反省討論

這是一份詮釋性的思想史研究，以澄清馬克思韋伯與法律研究之間的關係為目標。具體而言，本文試圖處理以下四個不同但相關聯的問題：首先，檢驗一個思想史的猜想，即韋伯作為法學生的經歷是否蘊含著一種可能性，其方法論思想、對社會科學的獨特理解是根本性地為法學所塑造的？我透過批判性地檢視支持此猜想的論點，否定了這個說法。第二，我想澄清韋伯對“法律”的方法論討論，試圖說明對韋伯而言，“法律”可以如何再現為研究對象？我發現就這個問題，韋伯不僅就應然與實然在方法論上的區分與關聯進行了討論，還就經驗現象之間的區分問題進行了討論。接著，我會詮釋韋伯作為法律史研究者的論述，並試圖使它們變得可以理解。作為第三個問題，我試圖理解韋伯的早期法律史研究──《論中世紀商社的歷史》和《羅馬農業史對國家法與私法的意義》──的主題。我回顧了關於韋伯的早期法律史研究的二手文獻，並發現韋伯的論述中對我稱為「去屬人化」這個歷史發展的關懷。最後，我試圖詮釋韋伯最重要的法律史著作，《法律的發展條件》。本文對「法律形式理性化」的詮釋典範進行了反省，並對《發展條件》的文本脈絡進行了重構。

關鍵字

馬克思韋伯；西方社會思想史；法律史；法律社會學；法學

並列摘要

This is an interpretative research on history of thought, aiming at clarifying the relation between Max Weber and legal studies. Concretely speaking, this article tries to deal with four following, different but correlating, questions: First, to examine whether the speculation that, as a law student, Weber’s methodological ideas and his distinct understanding of social science is seminally shaped by jurisprudence, is verifiable. Through a critical review of an argument for that case, I rejected this speculation. Secondly, I wanted to clarify Weber’s methodological discussion about “law,” trying to explain, for Weber, how can/should “law” be represented as a research object. Concerning this question, I found that Weber not only discusses about the methodological distinction between the ought and the is, as well as their connection, but also discusses about the differentiation among empirical phenomenon. Then, I interpreted Weber’s texts as a legal historian, trying to make those pieces intelligible. As the third question, I attempted to understand the theme of Weber’s early legal history studies – Zur Geschichte der Handelgesellchaften im Mittelalter and Die römische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für das Staats- und Privatrecht. I reviewed the secondary literatures concerning those texts and found that Weber’s discourses showed a special concern for a historical development I called “impersonalization.” Lastly, I tried to interpret Weber’s most important legal history work – Die Entwicklungsbedingungen des Rechts. I reflected upon the paradigm of interpretation of “formal rationalization of law,” and reconstructed the narrative contexts of Die Entwicklungsbedingungen.