論控制股東關係人交易之規範

臺灣公司組織所有與控制結構主要為家族少數股東控制型態，家族企業持股偏低而運用金字塔股權結構控制龐大企業集團為特徵，產生控制股東與少數股東代理問題。公司及證券管理法規，過往似未能關注此股權結構特性，而進行整體通盤考量，雖有相關修法或改革，仍未有效因應所衍生之公司治理問題。在少數股東控制結構，給予控制股東極大誘因去擷取控制者私利，而最常見之手段為關係人交易。實務上台灣資本市場頻仍出現控制股東運用不當關係人交易，惡意侵害少數股東與公司之案件，尤其著名企業集團進行非常規之關係人交易，成為重大財經弊案也是導致集團衰微重要原因。為規範控制股東關係人交易，在公司內部監督機制上，移植美國獨立董事制度管控控制股東，以抑止不當關係人交易；在對控制股東究責部分，引進英國影子董事制度，擴大董事責任適用範圍。惟獨立董事面對控制股東，有獨立性與取得關鍵資訊不易等制度上困境；影子董事則有要件過嚴格而證明不易，如何適用忠實義務之疑義。董事自我交易規定，倘控制股東亦擔任董事，因其控制力與影響力發揮運用，應有更嚴格審查以維護交易公平，故現行規範尚有不足。直接課予控制股東受任人義務，獨立建構明確忠實義務內涵，相較前述迂迴管控方式，為更實際有效之途徑。另為落實控制股東究責，應設置充足之少數股東救濟機制，完善對控制股東不當關係人交易之監控。

關鍵字

控制股東；少數控制；金字塔股權結構；公司治理；代理問題；關係人交易；內部人自我交易；影子董事；受任人義務

並列摘要

The ownership and structure of control of Taiwanese companies are mainly controlled by family minority shareholders. Family enterprises’ low ownership of shares is characterized by the use of a pyramid share structure to control a large corporate group: the agency problem is between the majority or controlling shareholders and minority or non-controlling shareholders. It seems that regulations regarding company and securities have not focused on the features of this structure to thoroughly review the regime. Although there are relevant amendments and reforms, they are still ineffective when it comes to the resulting corporate governance issues. Controlling shareholders have great incentive to capture the private benefits of control under minority control, and the prevailing method is transactions with related parties. The cases of controlling shareholders’ improper related party transactions along with malicious infringement upon minority shareholders and companies frequently appear in Taiwan’s capital market. Furthermore, some famous family enterprises conducted non-arm’s length transactions, which were not only major financial malpractices but also contributed to their decline. To regulate the controlling shareholders’ transactions with related parties, the following two regimes were introduced in Taiwan – an independent director and a shadow director. The function of the independent director is to monitor controlling shareholders as well as to deter unfair transactions with related parties. In the accountability of controlling shareholders, the stipulated shadow director is to expand the scope of application of directors' responsibilities. Nevertheless, independent directors have difficulty coping with controlling shareholders, such as independence and difficulty in obtaining key operational information from family enterprises. As for shadow directors, the requirements are too strict to prove; moreover, the insurance of duty and loyalty needs to be clarified. Directors’ self-dealing regulations should be more strictly reviewed to avoid the case of the controlling shareholder also serving as a director to maintain fair transactions. The current regulations are insufficient to deal with their possible control and influence on the board. Compared with the aforementioned circuitous control devices, a more practical and effective regime is to directly impose fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders and independently construct a clear connotation of obligations. Adequate minority shareholder relief mechanisms should be set up to implement accountability of controlling shareholders and to also improve the monitoring of controlling shareholders’ unfair related- party transactions.

並列關鍵字

controlling shareholders ； minority control ； pyramid share structure ； corporate overnance ； agency problem ； related party transaction ； insider self-dealing ； shadow director ； fiduciary duty